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COMMENTS
A SLAM DUNK FOR STATES’ RIGHTS:
THE IMPACT ON CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AND
FEDERAL REGULATIONS FOLLOWING THE SUPREME
COURT IN MURPHY V. NCAA
On May 5, 2018, in Louisville, Kentucky, rain soaked the
ground, and twelve-hundred pound thoroughbreds rounded the
bend toward the finish line.1  Thousands of people grasped their
wagers, watching as the first hoof crosses the mark.2  Justify won the
Kentucky Derby, and spectator Bill Krackomberger made $150,000
on a $500 bet he placed three months ago.3
I. HEDGING BETS: AN INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, sporting events and gambling have been
intrinsic pastimes in America’s culture.4  Modern sporting events,
such as football, baseball, basketball, and hockey have grown in
popularity and developed from traditional sporting events such as
archery, jousting, fencing, and horse racing.5  Gambling, on the
other hand, has been historically treated as a “vice” and banned
throughout most of the United States until the 1930s.6  However,
1. See Justin Sayers, This is Now the Wettest Kentucky Derby Ever and More Rain is
Coming, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (May 5, 2018) https://www.courier-journal.com/
story/sports/horses/triple/derby/2018/05/05/louisville-rain-flash-floods-ken-
tucky-derby/583870002/ [https://perma.cc/WU8X-992U] (describing conditions
of 2018 Kentucky Derby); see also Andrew Joseph, How One Bettors’ $500 Bet on Justify
to Win the Kentucky Derby Turned Into $150K, USA TODAY (May 6, 2018) https://
ftw.usatoday.com/2018/05/justify-kentucky-derby-bettor-futures-bet-300-to-1-150k-
gambling [https://perma.cc/VXZ7-N6JU] (describing winners of 2018 Kentucky
Derby).
2. See Joseph, supra note 1 (illustrating sports gambling wagers as risky but
worthwhile, involving luck and chance when betting odds are set at 300-to-1).
3. See id. (demonstrating risk paid off with large payout from surprise win).
4. See Where the Ponies Run for the Masses, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 1908), https://
www.nytimes.com/1908/05/31/archives/where-the-ponies-run-for-the-masses-
long-island-the-cradle-and.html [https://perma.cc/B75H-3ULJ] (emphasizing
sporting events have rich history such as horse racing on Long Island, New York
dating back to 1665).
5. See Daniel Kelly, Sports in the 1600’s, 1600 SPORTS (Dec. 2, 2012), http://
1600sports.blogspot.com/ [https://perma.cc/U8K6-EUYR] (discussing evolution
of sports).
6. See Vice, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining vice as “de-
pravity of corruption of morals; evil, immoral or wicked habits or conduct; indul-
(25)
1
Alexander: A Slam Dunk for States' Rights:  The Impact On Constitutional Fed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 2  2-MAR-20 12:00
26 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27: p. 25
during the Great Depression, state laws prohibiting gambling were
“gradually loosened” as a way to increase tax revenue.7
Over time, state laws continued to legalize different forms of
gambling ranging from horse races to nonprofit bingos and lotter-
ies.8  As more states considered legalizing sports gambling, the
growing trend pressured Congress to pass the Professional and Am-
ateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) in 1992 to prevent states
from legalizing sports gambling.9  Twenty years later, New Jersey be-
came the first state to challenge the constitutionality of PASPA.10
Initially resulting in defeat, New Jersey again challenged the consti-
tutionality of PASPA two years later, this time successfully arguing
that Congress could not commandeer the states’ autonomy under
the Tenth Amendment.11  In accordance with anti-commandeering
principles established in New York v. United States12 and Printz v.
United States,13 the Supreme Court ruled PASPA unconstitutional.14
gence in degrading pleasures or practices”); see also Steve Durham & Kathryn
Hashimoto, HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN AMERICA 34–35 (2010) (describing history of
gambling from organized crime to changes in different state laws resulting in eco-
nomic development of casinos).
7. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1469 n.1
(2018) (citing Kay C. James, NAT. GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT,
p. 2–1 (1999)) (illustrating that attitudes about gambling have swung back and
forth in America particularly when politicians promised increased tax revenues).
8. See id. at 1469 n.2 & 4–5, (citing Atl. City Racing Ass’n. v. Attorney Gen.,
498 A.2d 165, 167–68 (N.J. 1985); Bingo Licensing Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:8–24;
and State Lottery Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:9–1) (illustrating development from total
ban to slow legalization of gambling in New Jersey).
9. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (prohibiting authorization and legalization of
sports gambling not only from individuals but also majority of states); see also Mur-
phy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470 n.19–20 (citing S. Rep. No. 102–248, at 5; S. Hrg. 102–499,
at 10–14) (exemplifying fears about sports gambling that could have been resolved
with regulation rather than prohibition).
10. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 573 U.S. 931 (2014) (solidi-
fying defeat with denial of certiorari); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Gov-
ernor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Governor I] (affirming New
Jersey District Court’s decision in 2-1 split); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 577 (D.N.J. 2013) [hereinafter Christie I] (rejecting
Sports Wagering Act of 2012).
11. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488 (D.N.J.
2014) [hereinafter Christie II] (rejecting Sports Wagering Act of 2014), aff’d en
banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017), rev’d, 138 S.
Ct. 1461 (2018) (overturning all prior reasoning in favor of PASPA, and ruling it
unconstitutional); see specifically U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating “the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”).
12. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
13. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
14. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018)
(utilizing N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997), to overturn PASPA as unconstitutional).
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The holding meant Congress could not prohibit states from modify-
ing or repealing state law under the United States Constitution.15
The ruling’s ramifications have yet to fully be seen, but widespread
state legalization of sports gambling, as well as additional litigation
opposing federal regulations, is sure to ensue.16
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v.
NCAA,17 starting with a discussion of the case facts in Part II.18  Part
III includes an explanation of the background surrounding Murphy,
including a discussion of PASPA and its disputed statutory provi-
sions.19  Subsequently, Part IV illustrates the Supreme Court’s anal-
ysis involving federalism issues, and Part V critically examines the
Court’s decision with potential implications on drug, immigration,
environmental, and tax law.20  Finally, with a landmark decision
from the Supreme Court, Part VI discusses Murphy’s constitutional
impact on other commandeering regulations and the need to im-
plement a regulatory framework for sports gambling.21  In conclu-
sion, the Supreme Court’s holding in Murphy has upended
traditional notions of dual sovereignty and empowered states to re-
ject affirmative or prohibitive federal regulations analogous to the
now unconstitutional PASPA.22
II. A RISKY GAMBLE: THE FACTS OF MURPHY V. NCAA
Congress enacted PASPA to prohibit state-sanctioned sports
gambling with the legislative intent to protect young people and
safeguard the integrity of sports.23  PASPA made it unlawful for
states to permit any type of sports gambling scheme on professional
15. See id. at 1466 (holding PASPA violates anti-commandeering doctrine).
16. See Sam Kamin, Murphy v. NCAA: It’s About Much More Than Gambling on
Sports, THE HILL (May 15, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/
387653-murphy-v-ncaa-its-about-much-more-than-gambling-on-sports [https://
perma.cc/M34P-ZED6] (elaborating on ramifications of decision and impact on
variety of issues used to empower states’ rights).
17. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
18. For a discussion of PASPA, see infra notes 49–128 and accompanying text.
19. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461 at 1480 (emphasizing ruling will effect much
more than just sports gambling).  For a discussion of the facts, see infra notes 23–48
and accompanying text.
20. For a summary of the holding, see infra notes 129–183 and accompanying
text; For further analysis of the Murphy decision’s, see infra notes 186–220 and ac-
companying text.
21. For an analysis of the impact, see infra notes 221–297 and accompanying
text.
22. For a discussion of this thesis, see infra notes 298–303 and accompanying
text.
23. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482–84 (describing Congressional intentions for
drafting and enacting PASPA).
3
Alexander: A Slam Dunk for States' Rights:  The Impact On Constitutional Fed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 4  2-MAR-20 12:00
28 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27: p. 25
or amateur competitive games or athletes.24  In 2011, a referendum
to legalize sports gambling provided voters in New Jersey the oppor-
tunity to voice their opinion.25  The voter referendum passed with
overwhelming approval and permitted the state legislature to
amend New Jersey’s constitution.26  Following the sports-wagering
amendment, the New Jersey legislature quickly passed the Sports
Wagering Act of 2012 (“SWA of 2012”).27  The SWA of 2012 was
designed to issue licenses and regulate the operation of sports
pools to wager on professional and amateur sporting events at casi-
nos and racetracks.28  The SWA of 2012 and its legalization of sports
gambling was immediately enjoined by five leagues under PASPA.29
The United States and the NCAA argued the authorization of
sports gambling directly conflicted with PASPA and despite the
State of New Jersey’s best arguments that PASPA was unconstitu-
tional, the District Court upheld the law.30  On appeal, the Third
Circuit affirmed PASPA as well because the SWA of 2012 was an
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (1992) (stating “[i]t shall be unlawful . . . for a
governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize
by law or compact”).
25. See S. Con. Res. 49, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010) (drafting official ballot ques-
tion to read: “Shall the amendment to Article IV, Section VII, paragraph 2 of the
Constitution of the State of New Jersey, agreed to by the Legislature, providing
that it shall be lawful for the Legislature to authorize by law wagering at casinos or
gambling houses in Atlantic City and at racetracks, in-person or through an ac-
count wagering system, on the results of professional, certain college, or amateur
sport or athletic events, be approved?”).
26. See id. (passing legislation with voter support); see generally MaryAnn Spoto,
Sports Betting Back by N.J. Voters, NJ.COM (updated Mar. 30, 2019), https://
www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/nj_residents_vote_on_legalizin.html
[https://perma.cc/TY6N-M7F5] (announcing election results and its potential im-
plications); see also Official General Election Results: Public Question, N.J. DIV. OF ELEC-
TIONS (Nov. 8, 2011) available at https://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/assets/
pdf/election-results/2011/2011-official-gen-elect-public-question-results.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LSA3-4NV6] (detailing voter turnout and determining sixty-
four percent of New Jersey’s population voted in 2011 to approved of change).
27. See N.J. CONST., art. IV, § VII, para. 2 (amending by voter referendum); see
also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12A–1 (discussing statutory provisions, including twenty-one
year-old wagering minimum age requirement and creation of regulatory division
in Casino Control Commission with broad discretion).
28. See § 5:12A–1 (describing “[a]n Act permitting wagering at casinos and
racetracks on the results of certain professional or collegiate sports or athletic
events”).
29. See Christie II, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 490–91 (D.N.J. 2014) (listing five leagues
that filed suit against New Jersey: National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”), National Baseball Association (“NBA”), National Football League
(“NFL”), National Hockey League (“NHL”), and Major League Baseball
(“MLB”)).
30. See Christie I, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 577 (D.N.J. 2013) (rejecting Sports
Wagering Act of 2012 because of linguistics and practical applications contra-
dicting PASPA).
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authorization of sports gambling rather than a partial repeal of
prohibitions.31  After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the un-
certainty of PASPA’s constitutionality continued to perpetuate
itself.32
Following the judicial defeat, New Jersey legislature used the
judge’s opinion to formulate a new law attempting to legalize sports
gambling within PASPA.33  The legislature drafted a new law in ac-
cordance with the Third Circuit’s opinion to partially repeal state
laws prohibiting sports gambling, rather than an authorizing sports
gambling.34  The New Jersey legislature passed the Sports Wagering
Act of 2014 (“SWA of 2014”), the law at issue in Murphy, and New
Jersey Governor Chris Christie hesitantly signed it into law on Octo-
ber 17, 2014.35
Soon, the five leagues under PASPA sued the State of New
Jersey again, seeking a permanent injunction.36  After a similar
analysis, the District Court again struck down the New Jersey law in
favor of upholding PASPA’s constitutionality.37  The state appealed
to the Third Circuit, not once but twice, continuing to argue the
law violated the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering princi-
ple.38 The Third Circuit was apprehensive about overturning
31. See Governor I, 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming District Court’s
decision in 2–1 split that SWA of 2012 was incompatible with PASPA).
32. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 573 U.S. 931 (2014) (deny-
ing writ of certiorari to review PASPA & implications on New Jersey’s SWA of
2012).
33. See Christie II, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 506 n.15 (D.N.J. 2014) (relying on Gover-
nor I, 730 F.3d at 241–51) (suggesting repeal of gambling prohibitions “in whole or
in part” may be constitutional under PASPA but providing no alternative sugges-
tions to formulate new law in accordance).
34. See id. at 492 (noting legislatures attempted to draft new law as constitu-
tional based on recommendations following an injunction from Third Circuit
judges).
35. See id. (noting Governor Christie originally vetoed legislation with formal
statement called “Governor Christie’s Statement Vetoing S.2250, ECF No. 12-11”
because it was “novel attempt to circumvent . . . Third Circuit’s ruling” that “[ig-
nored] federal law rather than working to reform federal standards, is counter to
our democratic traditions and inconsistent with . . . Constitutional values I have
sworn to defend and protect”).
36. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 394
(3d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Governor II] (seeking to settle violation of New Jersey’s
laws under PASPA with permanent injunction).
37. See Christie II, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 498, 503–04, 506 (rejecting SWA of 2014
with reliance on previous analysis for SWA of 2012 as unconstitutional).
38. See Governor II, 832 F.3d at 401 (resulting in another steadfast decision that
PASPA “does not command states to take affirmative actions, and it did not present
a coercive binary choice”); see also Steven D. Schwinn, Symposium: It’s Time to Aban-
don Anti-Commandeering, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 17, 2017, 10:44 AM), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-time-abandon-anti-commandeering-
dont-count-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/ZD3L-W3K4] (defining anti-com-
5
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PASPA under the guise of commandeering and decided to affirm
the lower court decision, retracting its partial repeal suggestion as
an impractical theoretical analysis.39  The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and evidently found PASPA to be unconstitutional in
Murphy.40
Murphy was argued on December 14, 2017, with the state of
New Jersey urging that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering
principle because “it regulates a State’s exercise of its lawmaking
power by prohibiting it from modifying or repealing its laws prohib-
iting sports gambling.”41  On the other hand, the leagues and the
United States argued PASPA did not “command the States to take
any affirmative action” and thus could not violate the comman-
deering principle.42 Ultimately, the Court made parallels to the fed-
eral laws struck down in New York and Printz, but drew distinctions
from the federal laws upheld in South Carolina v. Baker,43 Reno v.
Condon,44 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining,45  and F.E.R.C. v. Missis-
sippi.46  The federal laws in all four of these cases were upheld as
constitutional under the Commerce Clause and were not in viola-
tion of the Tenth Amendment, unlike PASPA.47  The Court held
PASPA to be incompatible with our system of “dual sovereignty”
and an outright violation of the Constitution.48
mandeering as “the federal government cannot require states or state officials to
adopt or enforce federal law”).
39. See Governor II, 832 F.3d at 400 (indicating reluctance to invalidate PASPA
because Supreme Court only “invalidated laws on anti-commandeering grounds
on only two occasions”).
40. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327, 2328 (2017)
(providing New Jersey with opportunity to argue PASPA is unconstitutional with
grant of certiorari); see also Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct.
1461, 1484–85 (2018) (overturning all prior reasoning in favor of PASPA and rul-
ing it unconstitutional).
41. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471 (citing Christie I, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 561–62)
(emphasizing New Jersey’s main points of argument).
42. Id. at 1471 (citing Governor II, 832 F.3d at 401) (emphasizing fact that
“PASPA does not require or coerce the states to lift a finger”).
43. 485 U.S. 55 (1988).
44. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
45. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
46. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
47. For a further discussion of case holdings, see supra notes 43–46 and ac- R
companying text.
48. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018)
(describing analogy of armed guards attempting to stop votes that supports inher-
ent conflict in creating two governments instead of one; holding PASPA as viola-
tion that underscores constitutional blueprint of decentralized government).
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 7  2-MAR-20 12:00
2020] A SLAM DUNK FOR STATES’ RIGHTS 31
III. THE COMPETITIVE TENSIONS OVER THE LEGALIZATION OF
SPORTS GAMBLING IN THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY AND PASPA
Although New Jersey has advocated for the legalization of
sports gambling in recent years, the state was not always as progres-
sive with its views on gambling.49  In 1897, a voter referendum in
New Jersey banned gambling in the state.50  As a result, all forms of
gambling were illegal in New Jersey from 1897 until 1939, until the
state legalized racetrack gambling.51  Enforcement of the New
Jersey gambling ban was riddled with influences of organized
crime, particularly in Atlantic City where illegal casinos and book-
making operators thrived.52  Over the next fifty years, the New
Jersey legislature legalized different types of gambling – pari-
mutuel betting, raffles, bingo, amusement gaming, lotteries, and
eventually casinos in Atlantic City.53  In 1992, the federal govern-
ment intervened to protect consumers and the integrity of sports
with the passage of PASPA, banning state authorization and private
actors’ abilities to wager on sporting events.54  Until 2012’s passage
of the Sports Wagering Act, New Jersey had never officially legal-
ized sports betting.55
49.  For a further discussion of New Jersey’s historical approach to sports gam-
bling, see infra notes 50–55 and accompanying notes. R
50. See Gambling in New Jersey – Current Laws and Regulations, GAMBLING-
SITES.COM, https://www.gamblingsites.com/online-gambling-jurisdictions/us/
new-jersey/ [https://perma.cc/GK9A-5THD] (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (offering
comprehensive guide to historical gambling laws).
51. See The Complete History of Gambling in Atlantic City, NJONLINEGAMBLING
https://www.njonlinegambling.com/atlantic-city-history/ [https://perma.cc/
S34S-KHRD] (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (describing  history of Atlantic City and
gambling laws in New Jersey).
52. See id. (recognizing Atlantic City’s reputation with organized crime).
53. See Richard Lehne, A Contemporary Review of Legalized Gambling in New
Jersey, 50 J. RUTGERS U. LIBR. 47, 62–89 (1988) (describing development of gam-
bling in New Jersey up until 1988).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (1992) (banning  sports  wagering  in United States);
see also Mark Brnovich, Betting on Federalism: Murphy v. NCAA and the Future of Sport
Gambling, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 247, 257 (2018) (addressing concerns that
sports gambling is seen as regressive tax, legalizes bad behavior, and threatens the
integrity of sporting events by opponents or critics of its legalization).
55. See Brnovich, supra note 54, at 247 (noting Hawaii and Utah do not have R
any forms of legalized gambling and contrasting 2017 poll in which fifty–five per-
cent of Americans approved of gambling).
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A. Unfounded Fears Leading to the Passage and Enactment of
PASPA
The 102nd United States Congress based its decision to pass
and enact PASPA on a number of unfounded fears.56  In 1919, a
conglomerate of sports gamblers “fixed” the World Series by con-
vincing Chicago White Sox players to deliberately lose the game
against the Cincinnati Reds in exchange for money.57  Shortly after
this scandal, the federal government took a more laissez-faire ap-
proach to regulating the stock market, but never regulated or pro-
hibited sports gambling as immoral.58  Conversely, the legislature
ratified the Eighteenth Amendment and enacted the Volstead Act,
both of which effectively banned alcoholic beverages nationwide in
order to regulate the morality of citizens.59  Organized crime was at
its prime during the era of alcohol prohibition from 1920 to 1933,
but continued to thrive up until the 1980s.60  As time progressed,
organized crime grew and sought “to corrupt legitimate sectors of
our society,” including gambling and sports wagering.61  In 1992,
instead of narrowly tailoring a law to address specific organized
crime and its illegal activities specifically, Congress broadly prohib-
56. For a further discussion on the unfounded fears that led to the PASPA,
see infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. R
57. See 1919 World Series, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/post
season/mlb_ws_recaps.jsp?feature=1919 [https://perma.cc/UL27-QP3Y] (last vis-
ited Jan. 5, 2020) (discussing scandal, scores, and backlash surrounding rigged
World Series).
58. See id. (describing backlash surrounding rigged game that resulted in life-
time suspensions of players, but no regulations); see also S. David Young, The Case of
the Stock Market: Freedom vs. Regulation, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDU. (Mar. 1, 1984),
https://fee.org/articles/the-case-of-the-stock-market-freedom-vs-regulation/
[https://perma.cc/VPU4-DA9Y] (describing lack of regulation leading up to
Great Depression in 1929).
59. See Mark Barrett, Legislating Morality After Prohibition, FIRST THINGS  (Dec.
11, 2013), https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2013/12/legislating-
morality-after-prohibition [https://perma.cc/YK3V-DQQ9] (commenting on
moral legislation of morality from prohibition of alcohol to prohibition of sports
gambling and beyond).
60. See Dave Roos, How Prohibition Put the ‘Organized’ in Organized Crime, HIS-
TORY (updated Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/prohibition-organ-
ized-crime-al-capone [https://perma.cc/FBB9-RVUT] (explaining Eighteenth
Amendment history and mob crimes).
61. See Ronald  Reagan, Declaring  War  on  Organized  Crime,  N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/12/magazine/declaring-war-
on-organized-crime.html [https://perma.cc/ZNV8-7K33] (expressing that organ-
ized crime had become “far more encompassing and wide-reaching than in the
past” leading to Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, among other federal laws to
hinder organized crime).
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ited states and private actors from gambling on sporting events
throughout the United States.62
The provision of PASPA, Section 3702(1), at issue in Murphy
made it unlawful for “a government entity to sponsor, operate, ad-
vertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact” to partici-
pate in sports gambling or wagering schemes.63  PASPA prohibited
a comprehensive list of activities, including lotteries, sweepstakes,
and wagering schemes based on one or more competitive games
with professional leagues, amateur league, or team players.64  The
enforcement of PASPA did not make sports gambling a federal
crime, nor did it include violation fines.65  Rather, the enforcement
of PASPA required the United States Attorney General, as well as
professional and amateur sports organizations, to enjoin an action
prohibited by the text of the law, specifically state authorization at
issue here.66
Under PASPA, New Jersey was given the option of legalizing
sports gambling in Atlantic City – provided that it did so within one
year of the law’s effective date.67  The New Jersey state legislature
lacked the interest and support to legalize sports gambling at that
time in the 1990s, but in 2011, the State rethought its’ stance after
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (1992)  (banning state authorized sports wagering
in U.S.); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (reiterating constitu-
tional notions that means to accomplish objectives must be narrowly framed).
63. See §§ 3701–3704 (prohibiting variety of different activities, but not defin-
ing “scheme” in statute); see also id. § 3702(1) (defining “government entity” as: “a
State, a political subdivision of a State, or an entity or organization including an
entity or organized described in section 4(5) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(25 U.S.C. § 2703(5) (1992), that has government authority within territorial
boundaries of the United States, including on land described in section 4(4) of
such Act (§ 2703(4)”).
64. See § 3702(2) (prohibiting “a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or
promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a government entity” to participate in
“lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, di-
rectly or indirectly (through the use of geographical references or otherwise), on
one or more competitive games in which amateurs or professional athletes partici-
pate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such
athletes in such games”).
65. See § 3703 (stating “a civil action to enjoin a violation of § 3702 may be
commenced in an appropriate district court of the U.S. by the Attorney General
. . . or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports organization whose
competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such violation”).
66. See id. (noting method or lack thereof for enforcement); see also Brnovich,
supra note 54, at 247 (requiring collaborative effort of federal government with R
sports leagues).
67. See § 3704(a)(3) (stating “a betting, gambling, or wagering scheme, other
than a lottery described in paragraph (1), conducted exclusively in casinos located
in a municipality, but only to that extent”); see also Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1469 (2018) (explaining Atlantic City’s applicability
under this provision because no other application existed at time).
9
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once again falling on tough times.68  Since New Jersey missed the
opportunity to legalize sports gambling, Nevada has been the only
state in the country that benefited from a monopoly on the law.69
Montana, Oregon, and Delaware were also grandfathered into
PASPA because these states had legalized limited forms of individu-
alized sports gambling rather than casino-like sports gambling prior
to the statutory time period.70  New Jersey no longer wanted sports
gambling to be a monopoly enterprise and looked to the people, as
well as the state legislature, to undo it.71
On November 8, 2011, New Jersey residents voted on whether
the state constitution should be amended to allow the legislature to
vote on the legalization of sports gambling.72  While there was little
public debate about the proposed amendment, battle lines were
drawn among trade associations and a small number of weary casi-
nos.73  For instance, the Casino Association of New Jersey supported
the measure, while some casinos like Harrah’s Entertainment broke
with the trade association and warned the measure was “premature”
68. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1472 (mentioning stiff casino competition facing
Atlantic City in Northeast United States).
69. See JD McNamara, General Summary of Sports Betting in Nevada,
ROTOGRINDERS, https://rotogrinders.com/sports-betting/nevada-online-sports-
betting [https://perma.cc/QHE8-ASMP] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019) (discussing
Nevada as one of four states with comprehensive legislative framework that autho-
rizes and regulates sports betting, codified in 1949 under Title 41: Gaming; Horse
Racing; Sporting Events §§ 462–467).
70. See § 3704(a)(1) (allowing Nevada, Montana, Oregon, and Delaware to
keep its state laws authorizing sports gambling since laws were passed between Jan-
uary 1, 1976 and August 31, 1990); see also Duke Chen, States Offering Legal Sports
Betting, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (Feb. 9, 2018), available at https://
www.cga.ct.gov/2018/rpt/pdf/2018-r-0059.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GDD-HWV9]
(summarizing types of games each states with limited sports betting offer).
71. See Adam Thew, PASPA Repeal: What Does it Mean for the American Sports
Betting Market? LEXOLOGY (May 22, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/de
tail.aspx?g=B5b38add-e604-4424-ad0a-98001e155d4b [https://perma.cc/WU4A-
7VG5] (discussing implications of Nevada no longer having monopoly on sports
gambling); see also Richard N. Velotta, Supreme Court Sports-Betting Ruling to Have
Limited Nevada Impact, LAS VEGAS REV. JOURNAL (Apr. 28, 2018, 8:20 AM), https://
www.reviewjournal.com/sports/betting/supreme-court-sports-betting-ruling-to-
have-limited-nevada-impact/ [https://perma.cc/BQW2-2KUP] (elaborating on
Nevada Gaming Commission Chairman Tony Alamo’s surprising comments about
PASPA, stating to press that “I don’t think it will affect Nevada at all”).
72. See Official General Election Results: Public Question, NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
ELECTIONS (Nov. 6, 2011), available at https://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/as
sets/pdf/election-results/2011/2011-official-gen-elect-public-question-results.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C2BN-ZLV3] (explaining referendum text).
73. See Suzette Parmley, Sports Betting Bill in N.J. Gets Put on Hold, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER (June 11, 2010), https://www.philly.com/philly/business/20100611_
Sports_betting_bill_in_N_J__gets_put_on_hold.html [https://perma.cc/6MR3-
GQSD] (discussing support for and against).
10
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without overturning PASPA.74  Voters overwhelmingly approved the
constitutional amendment, with sixty-four percent of voters sup-
porting the legislature to legalize gambling on professional, col-
lege, and amateur sports events.75
B. Strike 1 and Strike 2: The SWA of 2012 and the Judiciary
The New Jersey legislature enacted its first law attempting to
authorize sports gambling in 2012 (“SWA of 2012”).76  Litigation of
SWA of 2012 ensued in the infamous NCAA v. Christie [hereinafter
Christie I],77 in which the plaintiff, a conglomerate of sports teams
and the United States Attorney General, argued the SWA of 2012
violated federal law under PASPA.78  The defendant, the State of
New Jersey and its respective parties, argued PASPA went beyond
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to violate the pro-
tected sovereign rights of states.79  The defendants did not argue
PASPA violated the Commerce Clause, but argued it violated the
Tenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Prin-
ciples, and the Equal Footing Doctrine.80
First, under the Commerce Clause, Congress has well estab-
lished broad powers to enact legislation.81  Here, the district court
used the legislative record prior to the passage of PASPA to support
a rational basis needed to prove a “sufficient nexus” between inter-
state commerce and the regulation of sports betting to pass the law
and its grandfathered provisions.82  Accordingly, the court con-
cluded Congress had the constitutional authority to regulate gam-
bling pursuant to the Commerce Clause.83
74. See id. (discussing opinions on new sports betting initiative).
75. For a further discussion of voter turnout, see supra note 25 and accompa- R
nying text.
76. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A–1 (2013) (implementing first round of sports
gambling laws following voter referendum and amendment).
77. 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013).
78. See id. at 578–79 (D.N.J. 2013) (noting the SWA of 2012 was enjoined by
plaintiffs in attempt to gain permanent injunction).
79. See id. at 558 (arguing while defendants favored SWA of 2012, plaintiffs
argued in favor of PASPA and its constitutionality under U.S. Constitution).
80. See id. at 578 (listing  wide array of arguments to overcome Commerce
Clause powers of Congress and application of Supremacy Clause).
81. See id. at 558 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)) (estab-
lishing broad powers of interstate commerce regulation).
82. See id. at 559 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)) (applying
commerce clause test of whether there existed rational basis for PASPA).
83. See id. at 559 (“[I]llegal gambling has been found by Congress to be in the
class of activities which exerts an effect upon interstate commerce” (quoting
United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1972))).
11
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Second, Congress cannot compel a state to take affirmative ac-
tion under the Tenth Amendment.84  Here, the district court re-
fused to expand the construction of New York and Printz to include
prohibitive actions based on precedent and the rule that statutes
are “presumptively constitutional.”85  Accordingly, the court con-
cluded Congress did not usurp state sovereignty because PASPA did
not cross the line “distinguishing encouragement from coercion”
under the Tenth Amendment.86
Third, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Principles
derived from the Fifth Amendment were upheld because the fed-
eral government had a “legitimate interest in stemming the tide of
legalized sports gambling and provided ample support for uphold-
ing PASPA pursuant to rational basis review.”87  Additionally, the
court dismissed the Equal Footing Doctrine because there was not
“good cause” to expand an outdated and rarely used constitutional
mechanism.88  Thus, the district court found the plaintiffs’ perma-
nent injunction valid and the defendants’ arguments void.89  The
district court held PASPA was constitutional and preempted the
SWA of 2012.90
84. See id. at 551, 567 (referencing U.S. CONST. amend. X, N.Y. v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997)
to determine “whether Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to
regulate in a particular field in a particular way”).
85. See id. at 557 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
537 (2012)) (emphasizing basic tenets of constitutional law as stating statutes are
presumptively constitutional).
86. See id. at 567 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 175) (arguing negative com-
mand that prohibits state from enacting any laws legalizing or licensing sports bet-
ting was affirmative command requiring state to maintain prohibitions on sports
gambling from New Jersey perspective; arguing PASPA did not require states to
conduct any legislative, executive, or regulatory acts from U.S. perspective).
87. Id. at 576 (using Fifth Amendment to determine Congress’ stated purpose
to extinguish legalized sports wagering was legitimate and rationally related to
Congressional aims to stop “irreversible momentum” of sport gambling, noting
exceptions were allowable because law was not meant to eradicate problem, but
merely to contain it).
88. See id. at 577 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1995)) (explaining
antiquated Equal Footing Doctrine as providing states added to United States to be
admitted on “equal footing” with original thirteen colonies).
89. See id. at 578–79 (summarizing action).
90. See id. (noting “as drafted the two statutory regimes cannot co-exist,” as
such “if PASPA [was] held to be constitutional, then [SWA of 2012] must be
stricken as preempted by the Supremacy Clause. Conversely, if this court finds
PASPA unconstitutional, it must be invalidated and [SWA of 2012] may be imple-
mented”).  As drafted the two statutory regimes cannot co-exist.  Accordingly, if
PASPA is held to be constitutional, then the SWL must be stricken as preempted
by the Supremacy Clause. Conversely, if this Court finds PASPA unconstitutional, it
must be invalidated and NJ SWL may be implemented.
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On appeal, the Third Circuit court affirmed the district courts’
judgement.91  The Third Circuit held PASPA was constitutional
under the Commerce Clause because sports gambling wagers and
national sports leagues are both economic activities that “substan-
tially affect” interstate commerce.92  Thus, the SWA of 2012 was pre-
empted and invalidated by the Supremacy Clause because the New
Jersey law was “precisely what PASPA says the states may not do – a
purported authorization by law of sports wagering.”93  Appellants
continued to argue that PASPA overextended the Commerce
Clause leading to a violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine
and equal sovereignty principle.94  The Third Circuit differentiated
PASPA from New York and Printz by stating PASPA did not require
states to “lift a finger,” reasoning only affirmative commands not
prohibitive commands have been struck down under the anti-com-
mandeering principle.95
Additionally, only two modern cases have applied the Equal
Sovereignty Principle.96  The Third Circuit determined PASPA’s
preferential treatment for states covered by the grandfathering
clause was fundamentally different, declining to find a constitu-
tional violation.97  In dicta, the Third Circuit suggested the only two
options: a complete repeal of its sports gambling prohibitions in
accordance with state law or a complete ban in compliance with
PASPA.98  In essence, the majority opinion determined PASPA was
91. See Governor I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming decision of Christie I)
(upholding PASPA and prohibition of sports gambling constitutional).
92. See id. at 225–26 (noting gambling regulations may be regulated under
Commerce Clause because gambling is “rational” and “quintessentially
economic”).
93. See id. at 227 (noting state law is preempted by federal law under
Supremacy Clause, as such “it is not telling the state what to do, it is barring them
from doing something they want to do” however application of preemption to in-
validate state law has never been interpreted as “an invasion” of state sovereignty).
94. See id. at 250 (emphasizing on appeal PASPA’s impermissible prohibition
of states from enacting legislation to license sports gambling and focusing on
PASPA’s unique exception to permit Nevada to license widespread sports gam-
bling while banning other state from doing so).
95. See id. at 231 (relying on precedent in N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), as “palpable” distinction
from Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering cases because statutes prohibiting
states from taking certain actions have never been struck down, even if requiring
cost, time, effort, modification, or invalidation of contradicting state laws).
96. See id. at 237–38 (citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2013) and Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)) (dis-
missing Equal Sovereignty claims).
97. See id at 238 (citing Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. 193) (dismissing Equal Sover-
eignty claims).
98. See id. at 232 (describing New Jersey’s legislature saw “meaningful distinc-
tion” between repeal and authorization, but just because two tough options does
13
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constitutional and suggested a distinction between repealing and
authorizing sports gambling laws.99
C. Foul Balls: The SWA of 2014 Involved Recanting Dicta
for the Judiciary
On October 9, 2014, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for
the Third Circuit’s holding regarding the SWA of 2012, leaving the
State of New Jersey with no other option than to repeal the uncon-
stitutional law and try again to legalize sports gambling.100  That
same day, the New Jersey legislature introduced another law, known
as the SWA of 2014, “partially repealing prohibitions against sports
wagering” at casinos and racetracks.101  The bill passed four days
later on October 14, 2014, but was vetoed by Governor Chris Chris-
tie who voiced his dismay with the law as a “novel attempt to circum-
vent the Third Circuits’ ruling.”102  The SWA of 2014 was eventually
signed into law on October 17, 2014 and explicitly stated “it shall be
construed to repeal State laws and regulations.”103  Litigation en-
sued in NCAA v. Christie,104 the second suit of the same name [here-
inafter Christie II], in which the state of New Jersey argued PASPA
did not preempt the SWA of 2014 because the partial repeal was
“expressly authorized” by the Third Circuits’ interpretation of
PASPA.105
not mean no options, quoting “the fact that Congress gave the states a hard or
tempting choice does not mean that they were given no choice at all, or that the
choices are otherwise constitutional”).
99. See id. (“We do not read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing its
ban on sports wagering . . . . Nothing in these words requires that the states keep
any law in place . . . . We do not see how having no law in place governing sports
wagering is the same as authorizing it by law.”).
100. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866, 2866
(2014) (solidifying defeat of SWA of 2012’s with denial of certiorari); see also Chris-
tie II, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 495 (D.N.J. 2014) (describing SWA of 2014’s swift
implementation).
101. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A–7 (2015) (passing decriminalization and le-
galization of sports gambling after referendum); see also S. 2250, 216th Leg. (N.J.
2014) (repealing SWA of 2012 and multitude of state prohibition on sports gam-
bling prior to enactment of PASPA, including casino and horse racetrack
gambling).
102. For a further discussion of the passage of SWA of 2014, see supra note 95 R
and accompanying text. SWA of 2014 passed with 28–10 and 73–4–0 vote counts in
New Jersey legislature.
103. See Christie II, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 495 (D.N.J. 2014) (citing § 5:12A–8)
(illustrating clever attempt by legislatures to prevent preemption and evade federal
law).
104. 61 F. Supp. 3d 488 (D.N.J. 2014).
105. See id. at 495 (emphasizing legislature’s attempt to draft law in accor-
dance with Third Circuit dicta because court expressly held PASPA would not
“prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban on sports wagering” which was later
14
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Despite a second opportunity to provide helpful insight, the
district court did not address the constitutionality of PASPA and
instead, merely incorporated the doctrine of preemption.106  The
district court concluded, with the support of jurisprudence, that the
SWA of 2014 was clearly preempted and did not violate the anti-
commandeering principle.107  The second opinion from the district
court simply relied upon the Third Circuit’s prior rebuttal that
PASPA commandeered states, despite the defendants argument
that PASPA “impose[d] an affirmative requirement on states . . . by
prohibiting them from repealing anti-sports wagering
provisions.”108
The Third Circuit determined nothing in PASPA required
New Jersey to uphold their state law prohibitions on sports gam-
bling, providing states with two binary choices.109  Seemingly a par-
tial repeal, the SWA of 2014 lead to the same results as the SWA of
2012 because there was “no practical difference in effect between
its repeal and authorization.”110  Furthermore, the district court re-
viewed the legislative intent of PASPA in order to determine
whether preemption was applicable.111  The purpose of PASPA was
to stop the “irreversible momentum” of sports betting.112  Likewise,
the goal of PASPA was “to ban gambling pursuant to a state scheme
because Congress was concerned that state-sponsored gambling car-
ried with it a label of legitimacy that would make the activity appeal-
ing.”113  Thus, the SWA of 2014 created “a label of legitimacy for
sports wagering pursuant to a state scheme” directly conflicting with
retracted); see supra note 30 (listing same plaintiffs who brought lawsuit against
New Jersey).
106. See id. at 498–99 (ignoring issue of PASPA’s constitutionality and possible
violation of anti-commandeering to focus on whether PASPA preempts SWA of
2014).
107. See id. at 502 (supporting district court to overturn SWA of 2014 was
linguistic technicalities from prior Third Circuit opinion ruling on SWA of 2012).
108. Id. at 500 (illustrating possible affirmative command from prohibitive
command).
109. See id. at 500–01 (describing binary choices “between repealing their
prohibitions on sports gambling entirely or retaining total bans” offered by court
will be recognized as no choice).
110. Id. at 504 (noting distinctions between repeal and authorize is
impractical).
111. See id. at 503–04 (noting legislatures passed SWA of 2014 in less than
week and provided no legislative history for court examination, creating interpre-
tation issues when compared to PASPA).
112. See id. at 504 (referencing PASPA’s purpose because Congress was “cog-
nizant that states were beginning to consider a wide variety of gambling schemes
that would allow sports gambling in their states”).
113. Id. at 499 (referencing PASPA’s goal).
15
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the intent of PASPA and simultaneously preempted under the
Supremacy Clause.114
On appeal, the Third Circuit sitting en banc upheld the district
court’s ruling that PASPA preempted the SWA of 2014 because the
latter violated the federal law with the authorization of sports gam-
bling.115  Here, the Third Circuit’s opinion focused not on whether
PASPA commandeered the states, but on whether a partial repeal
of sports gambling prohibitions was equivalent to the authorization
of sports gambling.116  The Third Circuit rejected its own previous
suggestion, “a repeal cannot constitute an authorization,” as unnec-
essary dicta because it was “too facile” of a distinction to apply.117  It
reasoned that a partial repeal is not a complete repeal because New
Jersey is still attempting to authorize sports gambling.118  Thus, the
SWA of 2014 did not make the binary choice offered and cannot be
upheld because it is “not a situation where there are no laws gov-
erning sports gambling in New Jersey.”119
Unlike the decision on SWA of 2012, the Third Circuit, here,
refused to articulate what the SWA of 2014 would need to do to
avoid conflicting with the authorization ban of sports gambling
under PASPA.120  The drafters of the SWA of 2014 attempted to
evade the Supremacy Clause with an explicit legislative statement
that the law did not intend to violate PASPA; however, “the force of
the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can be evaded by mere
mention of a particular word.”121  The Third Circuit concluded
114. See id. at 504–05 (discussing reasons why courts “have been unwilling to
allow states to do indirectly what they may not do directly”); see also id. (citing
Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 382–83 (1990)) (reinforcing that
“[t]he force of the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can be evaded by mere
mention of a word”).
115. See Governor II, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming District Court’s
ruling that PASPA was constitutional and preempted SWA of 2014).
116. See id. at 396–97 (discussing PASPA’s prohibition of affirmative authori-
zation by law); see also id. at 401–02 (rejecting argument that PASPA “presents
states with a coercive binary choice or affirmative command[s],” concluding it is
not unconstitutionally commandeering).
117. See id. at 397, 401 (rejecting its own dicta on appeal incorporated into
SWA of 2014).
118. See id. at 410 (discussing reasons why New Jersey should not be allowed to
repeal its sports gambling prohibitions even though it doesn’t establish compre-
hensive scheme like SWA of 2012).
119. Id. at 396 (illustrating how SWA of 2014 still authorizes gambling).
120. See id. at 406 (stopping short of issuing additional suggestion to support
or reject).
121. Id. at 398 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Howlett ex rel.
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 382–83 (1990)).  For a further discussion on the
Supremacy Clause, see supra note 109 and accompanying text. R
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SWA of 2014 violated PASPA with an authorization and denied anti-
commandeering principle violations.122
In his dissent, Judge Vanaske rebutted the constitutionality of
PASPA on appeals for both the SWA of 2012 and SWA of 2014.123
On the first appeal, the Third Circuit judge did not deny the au-
thority of Congress to regulate gambling pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause.124  However, the judge raised anti-commandeering
concerns involving political accountability and dual sovereignty.125
Specifically, that PASPA unconstitutionally “seek[s] to control or in-
fluence the manner in which States regulate private parties.”126  Re-
gardless of the distinction between affirmative and prohibitive
commands, the “federal government is regulating how states regu-
late.”127  On the second appeal, the Third Circuit judge again
raised federalism concerns with strong conviction.128  The judge re-
lented that the State of New Jersey did exactly what the majority
opinion suggested, yet the majority opinion here retracts its
dicta.129  In doing so, it neglects a meaningful distinction, and as-
serts a false equivalence between repealing and authorizing sports
gambling.130  Evidently, Judge Vansake’s opinion that the distinc-
tion between repeal and authorization was “unworkable” and left
122. See id. at 402 (summarizing holding to reject dicta, affirm PASPA, and
ignore potential constitutional issues).
123. See Governor I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (Vanaske, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (concluding PASPA’s regulations do not just regulate
interstate commerce or activities but dictate what states are permitted to do and
how states must treat sports gambling); see also Governor II, 832 F.3d at 406–11
(Vanaske, J., dissenting) (upholding constitutional principles despite being in dis-
sent, ultimately in accordance with Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018)).
124. See Governor I, 730 F.3d at 241, 249 (Vanaske, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (commenting on Commerce Clause powers).
125. See id. at 248–49 (raising valid anti-commandeering concerns).
126. Id. at 251 (quoting S.C. v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514–15 (1988)) (citing
Reno v. Condon, 538 U.S. 141, 150 (2000)) (supporting New Jersey’s comman-
deering arguments).
127. See id. at 251 (emphasis omitted) (referencing precedent in N.Y. v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
921 (1997) as evidence).
128. See Governor II, 832 F.3d at 407–08 (Vanaske, J., dissenting) (quoting
Prigg v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 541 (1842)) (finding false equivalency
between repeal and authorization and commandeering, stating “[t]he Supreme
Court has never considered Congress’s legislative power to be so expansive”).
129. See id. at 407 (describing how majority opinion choose to excise its previ-
ous dicta, even though it was “cornerstone of the holding in Christie I”).
130. See id. at 406–07 (demonstrating frustration at court for dicta not upheld
and recognizing facile distinction is impossible to implement regardless of whether
N.J.’s ability or action to permit sports gambling under PASPA).
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states with no choice was vindicated when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.131
IV. AGAINST ALL ODDS: THE SUPREME COURT’S RATIONALE
IN MURPHY V. NCAA
After a careful analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that
PASPA violated the anti-commandeering principle of the United
States Constitution, holding provision 28 U.S.C. Section 3702(1),
prohibiting the government from gambling, could not be upheld
under any other constitutional mechanism nor was it severable
from Section 3702(2), prohibiting individuals from gambling.132
The Court determined Congress lacked the constitutional power to
directly compel states to require or prohibit legislation under the
Tenth Amendment.133  Thus, the Court could not uphold the law
in its current form, under the Supremacy Clause or preemption
theory, nor any other constitutional mechanism.134  In reversing
the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court reasoned that comman-
deering an affirmative action and imposing a prohibition were
“empty” distinctions.135  Thereafter, the Court held PASPA and its
nationwide ban on state authorized sports gambling schemes
unconstitutional.136
131. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327, 2328
(2017) (granting writ of certiorari).  For a further discussion on the opinion, see
supra note 123 and accompanying text. R
132. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1489
(2018) (allowing New Jersey and other states to legalize sports gambling).
133. See id. at 1476–77 (describing how Congress overstepped its constitu-
tional power to enact PASPA).
134. See id. at 1481 (determining PASPA could not be upheld under
Supremacy Clause because it did not satisfy requirements, leaving no applicable
way to uphold PASPA); see specifically U.S. CONST. art. VI cl. 2 (“This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”); see also The Supremacy Clause and the Doctrine of Preemption, FIN-
DLAW, https://litigation.findlaw.com/legal-system/the-supremacy-clause-and-the-
doctrine-of-preemption.html [https://perma.cc/VG4U-7XDK] (last visited Jan. 6,
2020) (defining preemption theory as “based on the Supremacy Clause, federal
law preempts state law, even when the laws conflict.  Thus, a federal court may
require a state to stop certain behavior it believes interferes with, or is in conflict
with, federal law”).
135. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (2018) (emphasizing lack of difference
between repeal and authorization).
136. See id. at 1479–81 (comparing and contrasting commandeering cases
that were found to be unconstitutional versus commandeering cases that were not
found constitutional).
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A. The Linguistics of the Anti-Authorization Term in 28 U.S.C.
Section 3702(1) and an Interpretation of a Partial or
Total Repeal of the Provision
To determine the validity of a repeal, the Court addressed the
validity of arguments involving state authorization of sports gam-
bling in the Petitioners’ and Respondents’ briefs.137  The Third Cir-
cuit could not conclusively determine “which, if any, partial repeals
[would be] allowed,” but originally hinted a repeal could be possi-
ble without violating PASPA.138  Moreover, Respondents and the
government agreed a repeal of gambling prohibitions could be pos-
sible, but failed to identify a distinction between a partial and com-
plete repeal.139  In an attempt to rectify the disparity, the Court
articulated a potential partial repeal, only to determine the result
would be contrary to legislative intent and counterintuitive to the
framework of PASPA.140  The Court favored the Petitioners’ defini-
tion of state authorization, summarizing it as when a state com-
pletely or partially repeals their sports gambling prohibitions prior
to PASPA “‘authorize[ing] that activity.”141  However, the Court ra-
tionalized the “[statute] would still violate the anti-commandeering
principle” regardless of a definition.142
137. See id. at 1472–74 (relying on Brief for Petitioners in No. 16-476 (sup-
porting partial or total repeal) and Brief for Respondents in Opposition in No. 13-
967 (supporting neither partial nor total repeal with support of the text referring
to “authorization by law” in 28 U.S.C.S. § 3702(1) and “pursuant to the law” in 28
U.S.C.S. § 3702(2), applying to all “government entities” as defined by the stat-
ute)); see also Paul Mulshine, The Supreme Court’s Decision to Legalize Sports Betting:
That’s Real Progress, NJ.COM (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.nj.com/opinion/2018/
05/the_supreme_courts_decision_to_legalize_sports_bet.html [https://perma.cc/
V4RH-RKPP] (noting “a state is not regarded as authorizing everything . . . it does
not prohibit or regulate”).
138. See Governor II, 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) (maintaining possibility
of repeal but rejecting clever maneuver by New Jersey legislatures to incorporate
into law at issue into their opinion in Governor I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) into
law at issue, emphasizing PASPA does not prohibit New Jersey from repealing
sports gambling prohibitions, rather “it is left up to each state to decide how much
a law enforcement priority it wants to make of sports gambling, or what the exact
contours of the prohibition will be”).
139. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475
(2018) (emphasizing lack of clarity or “clear line” between partial and total
repeal).
140. See id. at 1475 (explaining states can enact laws “enabling, but not requir-
ing” local government to authorize sports gambling instead of state but local au-
thorization could be problematic).
141. See id. at 1474 (rebutting Respondents’ definition; noting definition is
irrelevant since PASPA is unconstitutional regardless of definition selected).
142. Id. at 1474–75 (stating “The repeal of a state law banning sports gam-
bling not only ‘permits’ sports gambling (petitioners’ favored definition); it also
gives those now free to conduct a sports betting operation the ‘right or authority to
act;’ it ‘empowers’ them (respondents’ and the United States’ definition)”).
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B. Extending Anti-Commandeering Protections Under the
Tenth Amendment
The majority reiterated its belief in the importance of anti-
commandeering because the United States Constitutional principle
protects liberty, promotes political accountability, and prevents reg-
ulation cost shifting.143  The Supreme Court has seldom dealt with
anti-commandeering cases, as Murphy is only the third Supreme
Court case to strike down federal action.144
The first anti-commandeering case ruled unconstitutional was
New York, where “the Court held that a federal law unconstitution-
ally ordered the State to regulate in accordance with federal stan-
dards.”145  The second anti-commandeering case was Printz, in
which “the Court found that another federal statute unconstitution-
ally compelled state officers to enforce federal law.”146 Murphy is
now the third Supreme Court case involving a federal law that the
Court ruled unconstitutional due to its violation of the comman-
deering doctrine embedded in the United States Constitution.147
The Court out rightly rejected the distinction of comman-
deering – affirmative action versus prohibitive action – as a “matter
of happenstance” and held Congress could not issue an order to
state legislatures “in either event.”148  This constituted a major shift
in the understanding of anti-commandeering principle, rejecting
the previous belief that only affirmative action by the federal gov-
ernment could be considered commandeering the states.149  It had
long been established that as long as the federal government did
not request affirmative action, such as passing new legislation or
allocating enforcement funds, the federal government was not com-
143. See id. at 1477 (emphasizing division of authority between States and Fed-
eral government as being for “[the] protection of individuals,” not States prevent-
ing “the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front;” noting voters who dislike
effects or costs of regulation know what elected officials to blame or credit, ensur-
ing political responsibility is not blurred by commandeering) (citing N.Y. v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992), Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997),
and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
144. See id. at 1471 (illustrating minimal jurisprudence precedent).
145. Anticommandeering Principle – Sports Gambling Prohibition, 33. NO. 6 FED.
LITIGATOR NL 5 (discussing holding of New York, 505 U.S. 144, as it relates to Mur-
phy, 138 S. Ct. 1461).
146. Id. (discussing outcome of Printz, 521 U.S. 898, and its impact on Murphy,
138 S. Ct. 1461).
147. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (holding PASPA unconstitutional in third
major commandeering case).
148. See id. at 1478 (extending logic of commandeering within reason to in-
clude either event).
149. See id. at 1489 (illustrating impact of decision on future commandeering
cases).
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mandeering the states.150  Following the Supreme Court’s reason-
ing in Murphy, now even if the states are not required to “lift a
finger,” the prohibitive action requested by the federal government
like PASPA will commandeer the states.151  The Court held PASPA
“unequivocally” violated the anti-commandeering principle because
the specific provision of the federal law “dictate[d] what a state leg-
islature may and may not do.”152
The Respondents and the United States unsuccessfully argued
New York and Printz were inapplicable in this case because the fed-
eral laws at issue in those cases “told states what they must do in-
stead of what they must not do.”153  Respondents relied on four
cases involving federal laws that were unsuccessfully argued as com-
mandeering, but were upheld under different constitutional mech-
anisms such as the Commerce Clause or Supremacy Clause.154 The
Court rebutted the use of these cases and their prior decisions as
precedent, stating they were “misread” and did not support the
constitutionality of the PASPA provision at issue.155  The Court re-
jected the notion it has upheld unconstitutional commandeering in
the past, reiterating the Court has “never” upheld a federal statute
that commandeered the state’s legislative process within its own
states’ border.156
150. See Christie I, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 570 (D.N.J. 2013) (ruling in accor-
dance with traditional and established anti-commandeering doctrine).
151. See Governor II, 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Governor I, 730
F.3d 208, 231 (3d Cir. 2013) (overturning law)).
152. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (“It is as if federal officers were installed in
state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators
from voting on any offending proposals.  A more direct affront to state sovereignty
is not easy to imagine.”).
153. Id. at 1478 (citing Brief for Respondents at 19, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (Nos. 16-476, 16-477), 2017 WL 4684747, at
*19)) (arguing commandeering occurs “only when Congress goes beyond preclud-
ing state action and affirmatively commands it”).
154. See id. at 1478 (noting case law precedent in South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505 (1988), Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), and F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742 (1982) as differentiator not applied in this case).
155. See id. at 1478  (setting court records straight that Respondents and
United States misread precedent).
156. See id. at 1461 (“[I]n none of them did we uphold the constitutionality of
a federal statute [commanding] state legislatures to enact or refrain from enacting
state law.”).  For a further discussion, see supra note 43–46 and accompanying text. R
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C. Rebutting the Presumption of Validity Under the
Supremacy Clause
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that PASPA could
be upheld by preemption theory under the Supremacy Clause.157
Universally, federal law is supreme if it conflicts with state law, but
the provision at issue here did not satisfy the two requirements for
preemption theory.158  Regardless of the statute, preemption theory
only works if the federal law is constitutional and regulates the con-
duct of private actors, not the states.159  The PASPA provision is not
a constitutional exercise of power because it (1) commandeers the
states and (2) does not regulate private actors.160  In essence, state
law does not conflict with federal law if the federal government
overstepped its constitutional limits by commandeering and regu-
lating states, which is exactly what happened in Murphy.161  The
Court recognized the potential for 28 U.S.C. Section 3702(2) to be
upheld under the Supremacy Clause because the provision regu-
lates private actors rather than states, although that provision was
not at issue in the case.162
D. The Dilemma of Modern Severability Precedent and
Congressional Intent
After determining 28 U.S.C. Section 3702(1) was unconstitu-
tional, the Court posed the question of severability: whether the
prohibition of authorization and licensing “doom[ed] the remain-
157. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479
(2018)  (rejecting Respondents’ and United States’ arguments to uphold PASPA
under another constitutional mechanism of federal lawmaking; providing “a rule
of decision” under preemption, not independent grant of Congressional power)
(citing Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015)).
158. See id. at 1480–81 (summarizing three types of preemption as conflict,
express, and field preemption in which “every form of preemption is based on a
federal law that regulates the conduct of private actors, not the States”).
159. See id. at 1478 (reiterating federal government cannot commander states
under another constitutional mechanism like preemption if law is still comman-
deering, illustrating commandeering doctrine does not apply when “Congress
evenhandedly regulates an activity in which both States and private actors
engage”).
160. See id. at 1479 (describing two requirements for preemption to apply
which are not met).
161. See id. at 1481 (emphasizing this provision of law was unconstitutional).
162. See id. (contrasting 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) with § 3702(2) to determine if
second provision could survive under preemption theory had entire law not been
ruled unconstitutional because federal government isn’t commandeering states
and merely regulating conduct of private actors).
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der of the law.”163  Severability is a principle that allows unconstitu-
tional provisions within legislation to be eliminated, while keeping
the rest of the bill intact.164  The Murphy Court answered affirma-
tively.165 Severing the PASPA  provisions would have allowed the Su-
preme Court to strike down the prohibition of sports gambling
authorization for states, while upholding the prohibition of sports
gambling authorization for private actors.166  No provision of
PASPA was severable from the provision at issue for the following
three reasons.167  First, Congress would likely not have prohibited
commercial activities that are permitted for private parties if Con-
gress knew it would result in “a scheme sharply different” from Con-
gress intended from the enactment of PASPA.168  Second, Congress
intended the two provisions to work together “in tandem” to imple-
ment a comprehensive federal policy, and “if Congress had known
that the latter provision would fall, we do not think it would have
wanted the former to stand alone.”169  Third, Congress rarely pro-
hibited or restricted advertising and it was unlikely Congress would
have wanted the advertising provision to limit First Amendment
rights without accomplishing a larger legislative goal.170  As the
Court noted in the concurrence, severability is a form of judicial
163. See id. at 1482 (posing question of severability in attempt to save PASPA);
see generally Severable, BLACK LAW’S DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), available at Westlaw
(defining severable as “admitting of severance or separation, capable of being di-
vided; capable of being severed from other things to which it was joined, and yet
maintaining complete and independent existence”).
164. See Severable, BLACK LAW’S DICTIONARY (defining severable)
165. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484 (stating Supreme Court would not try to
save PASPA via severability).
166. See Severable, BLACK LAW’S DICTIONARY (referencing severability
definition).
167. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484 (explaining logic for striking down PASPA
in its entirety).
168. See id. at 1462 (“[I]t is ‘evident that [Congress] would not have enacted
those provisions which are within its power, independent of [those] which are
not.’” (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)); Free En-
terprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509
(2010) (noting “whether the law remains ‘fully operative’ without the invalid provi-
sions without rewriting the statute as a whole” is important issue); R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935) (noting Courts “cannot rewrite a statute
and give it an affect altogether different” than what Congress intended as
lawmakers)).
169. Id. at 1463 (illustrating adverse result of provision would make private
conduct violation of federal law, but only if sports gambling was permitted by state
law; noting enforcement scheme doesn’t make sports gambling federal crime with
jail time or financial penalties, but enforces law via civil lawsuits against states by
US Attorney General and sports organizations).
170. See id. at 1485 (demonstrating how government rarely forbid advertising,
providing cigarettes as example of heavily regulated industry but banned due to
First Amendment).
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lawmaking and involves a guessing game of Congressional intent
and should not be overused.171  For those reasons, the Court held
no provision of PASPA was severable.172
E. Homerun: Certiorari Granted to Interpret the Tenth
Amendment
The ruling of Murphy was not simply about the authorization or
legalization of sports gambling; rather, the decision was really about
states’ rights.173  The lower courts were wary about upsetting the
status quo of federal regulations surrounding the Tenth Amend-
ment.174  The courts indicated that political accountability for
PASPA, a benchmark for anti-commandeering principles, was not
an issue.175  The lower court recommended that the “remedy is not
through passage of a state law or through the judiciary, but through
the repeal or amendment of PASPA in Congress.”176  However, the
remedy would be difficult if not impossible as New Jersey is just one
state in the national election process and national lawmakers would
“remain insulated from the electoral ramification of their
decision.”177
The ruling in Murphy turned on whether or not an affirmative
and prohibitive command from the federal government implicates
the anti-commandeering principle.178  The Constitution provides
171. See id. at 1486 (describing reasoning and concurrence); see also Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (noting judicial review originated from this case).
172. For a further discussion of severability issues with provision context, see
infra note 173–178. R
173. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1461 (demonstrating widespread implications
beyond just sports gambling).
174. See Governor II, 832 F.3d 389, 410 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming District
Court’s decision en banc) (ignoring commandeering issue); see also Governor I, 730
F.3d 208, 250 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming District Courts decision in 2-1 split); Chris-
tie I, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 578 (D.N.J. 2013) (rejecting SWA of 2012); Christie II, 61
F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (D.N.J. 2014) (rejecting SWA of 2014).
175. See generally Christie II, 61 F. Supp. 551 (D.N.J. 2013) (excluding political
accountability as potential issue in rationale all together).
176. Christie I, 926 F. Supp. at 555 (mentioning political accountability as po-
tential issue in rationale but dismissing it as invalid).
177. Id. (suggesting practicality for N.J. to sway public opinion of entire coun-
try); see also Governor I, 730 F.3d at 240–41 (reaffirming decision and quoting:
“[New Jersey] and any other state may wish to legalize gambling on sports within
their borders are not without redress. Congress may again choose to do so or,
more broadly, may choose to undo PASPA although. It is not our place to usurp
Congress’ role simply because PASPA may become an unpopular law. The forty –
nine states that do not enjoy PASPA”).
178. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (recognizing the lower court’s ruling on
both SWA of 2012 and SWA of 2014 ignored or misinterpreted the possibility of
anti-commandeering implications); see also id. at 1476 (relying upon U.S. Constitu-
tion and Tenth Amendment).
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that the federal government and the states, with fundamental sover-
eign powers, creates a “dual sovereignty” system.179  The constitu-
tional structure allows the federal and state government to regulate
their respective citizens, however the federal government cannot
regulate state governments.180  The federal government has “ple-
nary legislative power, but only certain enumerated powers.”181
Therefore, all other powers not designated are reserved for state
governments.182  Congress has the authority to pass legislation, but
under the Tenth Amendment, does not have the authority to di-
rectly command or compel States to enact or “enforce a federal
regulatory program.”183
V. ALL IN: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING
IN MURPHY V. NCAA
The Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy creates a new binding
precedent and expands the concept of anti-commandeering.184
The lower courts continuously dismissed New Jersey’s constitution-
ality concerns implicated by PASPA, so much so, that the Supreme
Court’s ruling to overturn PASPA as a violation of anti-comman-
deering principles was pleasantly surprising.185  Specifically, the
179. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (noting sovereignty
limits, like preemption, that require federal law to supersede state law if conflict
exists).
180. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (explaining Constitution “confers upon
Congress powers to regulate individuals, not States” (quoting New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).  State sovereignty originated in the Declaration
of Independence until the Constitution limited individual state sovereignty for sov-
ereignty of the whole country, of which Founding Fathers debated between Vir-
ginia and New Jersey plan; emphasizing our Founding Fathers chose the New
Jersey plan to ban direct orders to States but allow direct orders to private actors to
further federalism after experiencing Articles of Confederation which lacked au-
thority for Congress “in most respects to govern the people directly” leading to
inefficient and ineffective governance. See id. at 1476 (quoting New York, 505 U.S.
at 166)).
181. Id. at 1485 (discussing congressional limits on its authority to legislate,
quoting “[t]he Constitution gives Congress no such power” to regulate states’
citizens).
182. See id. at 1475 (expressing limits and abilities of Congress to require or
prohibit certain acts).
183. See id. at 1476 (explaining compelling federal interest does not suffice to
conscript States as agents or intermediary because if strong enough interest then
federal government would act directly, mentioning consent is not valid defense to
commandeering because States cannot consent to unconstitutional or illegal act of
Congress).
184. See generally id. at 1461 (establishing new landmark anti-commandeering
precedent).
185. For a further discussion of this ruling, see supra note 127 and accompa- R
nying text.
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Third Circuit was reluctant and even borderline unwilling to chal-
lenge the status quo of commandeering precedent, whereas the Su-
preme Court immediately recognized the unconstitutionality of
PASPA.186  The Murphy ruling not only legalized sports gambling,
but more importantly, was an attempt to restore the constitutional
balance of power among the federal government and states.187
A. Reaffirmation and Expansion of Precedential Consistency
The lower court’s rationale showed it was irrefutable that Con-
gress had the ability to regulate a plethora of activities, including
sports gambling, under the Commerce Clause.188  Congress simply
needed a sufficient nexus to substantially affect interstate com-
merce in order to uphold PASPA under the Commerce Clause, and
by definition sports gambling does just that.189  However, following
the application of the Commerce Clause, the district court, in their
first opinion, should have held that PASPA unconstitutionally com-
mandeered the states.190  Unfortunately, the lower courts deliber-
ated on PASPA three more times and neglected to readdress the
constitutionality of the law.191
The Supreme Court correctly interpreted PASPA to be uncon-
stitutional after attempting to follow the logic of the lower courts
and its distinction between repeal and authorization.192  In prac-
tice, the application of such a distinction in theory was implausible,
186. See generally Governor I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (refusing to rule in
accordance with U.S. Constitution and Tenth Amendment because Third Circuit
did not properly interpret anti-commandeering doctrine implicated and was too
deferential to Congress in implementing constitutional laws); Governor II, 832 F.3d
389 (3d Cir. 2016) (refusing same).
187. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (restoring separation of power between
Legislative and Judicial branches, as well as, restoring balance of power between
states and federal government).
188. For a further discussion on the establishment of gambling regulations,
see supra note 79 and accompanying text. R
189. For a further discussion of the establishment of interstate application,
see supra note 78 and accompanying text. R
190. See Christie I, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 557 (D.N.J. 2013) (exploiting congres-
sional statutes should not be presumed constitutional to protect constitutional
limits).
191. See Governor I, 730 F.3d at 241 (affirming district court’s decision to reject
Sports Wagering Act of 2014); see also Christie II, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 508 (D.N.J.
2014) (rejecting Sports Wagering Act of 2014); see also Governor II, 832 F.3d at 402
(affirming District Courts decision en banc; illustrating legislative history that
could have been prevented for litigation and judicial efficiency if logical reasoning
applied).
192. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1466 (overturning all prior reasoning in favor of
PASPA and ruling it unconstitutional).
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resulting in the same unconstitutional result.193  Anti-comman-
deering precedent, in New York and Printz, only dealt with affirma-
tive commands not prohibitive commands.194  Lower courts should
rely on more than precedent, and should review historical docu-
ments, like the Federalist Papers, to interpret and better under-
stand the framers’ intentions.195 Thus, the lower courts narrowly
misinterpreted case law precedent to include only affirmative com-
mands that “told states what they must do instead of what they must
not do” as unconstitutional instead of including both affirmative
and prohibitive commands as unconstitutional.196  Here, the dis-
tinction is null because PASPA is equivalent to having federal of-
ficers “installed in state legislative chambers . . . armed with the
authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending
proposals.”197
States have seldom been successful in using the Tenth Amend-
ment as a rebuttal to overreaching and seemingly unconstitutional
regulations from the federal government.198  Accordingly, the two
time Third Circuit dissenter Judge Vanaske argued against PASPA
and appropriately predicted the law would leave the states with no
choice.199  Courts should not be so quick to dismiss potentially valid
arguments that may challenge the status quo since constitutional
protections are more important than mere statutory
interpretations.200
Unlike the Supreme Court, the lower courts’ rulings were
blinded by the rule that assumed Congressional actions are “pre-
sumptively constitutional.”201  However, the Supreme Court may
193. See id. at 1478 (rejecting linguistic distinctions between repeal and
authorize).
194. For a further discussion of these cases, see supra note 158 and accompa- R
nying text.
195. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, (James Madison) (concerning dual
sovereignty and elaborating on ideas that “powers delegated by the proposed Con-
stitution to the federal government are few and defined”).  “Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” Id.
196. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1472–73 (suggesting lower court ignored consti-
tution and defied logic).
197. Id. at 1478 (quoting “[a] more direct affront to state sovereignty is not
easy to imagine”).
198. For a further discussion of balance of power, see supra note 151 and R
accompanying text.
199. For a further discussion of the dissent points, see supra notes 118–125 R
and accompanying text.
200. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (demonstrating careful analysis needed to
uphold inherent federalism).
201. For a further discussion on rule assumptions, see supra note 81 and ac- R
companying text.
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wish to rethink this assumption because courts can make the wrong
assumption, as evidenced by the Murphy decision.202  Instead, courts
should carefully analyze the validity of each statue with skepticism
in an attempt to protect states from an imbalance of power.203  The
importance of the anti-commandeering doctrine should not be un-
derestimated to combat federal government actions from infring-
ing upon state rights concerning liberty, political accountability,
and cost shifting implications.204 Murphy is now the third anti-com-
mandeering case and further expands the doctrine to include pro-
hibitive commands in addition to affirmative commands.205
B. Restoration of Separation and Balance of Power
The provision at issue, 28 U.S.C. Section 3702(1), violated the
commandeering doctrine and was incorrectly upheld under the
Supremacy Clause by the lower courts.206  A federal law can only
trump state law under the Supremacy Clause when the law is consti-
tutional and regulates private actors, not states.207  Here, PASPA
cannot preempt SWA of 2014; however, the Supreme Court noted
that if the provision 28 U.S.C. Section  3702(2) was at issue, the
analysis would have upheld PASPA as constitutional under the
Supremacy Clause.208  In an attempt to severe the first provision
from the second provision, the Supreme Court reviewed the con-
gressional intent of PASPA and determined Congress intended this
to be a comprehensive policy and it would not make sense to strike
one provision without striking the other.209  Therefore, it is possible
Murphy could set a new precedent to ensure the upholding of sepa-
ration of powers and prevent judicial lawmaking.210
202. For a further discussion on the importance of anti-commandeering, see
supra note 150 and accompanying text. R
203. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (explaining courts must be nuanced in
statutory analysis).
204. See id.  at 1489 (detailing three important issues to state rights).
205. For a further discussion on lack of distinction between prohibitive and
affirmative commands, see supra note 132 and accompanying text. R
206. For a further discussion on provision overturned, see supra note 169 and R
accompanying text.
207. For a further discussion of the two requirements needed to uphold
Supremacy Clause, see supra note 165 and accompanying text. R
208. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481 (majority and dissent) (noting possibility of
different outcome).
209. For a further discussion of PASPA severability, see supra note 172–174 R
and accompanying text.
210. For a further discussion on the concerns about frequent judicial lawmak-
ing, see supra note 175 and accompanying text. R
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The majority opinion distinguished itself from the dissent over
the issue of modern severability precedent.211  However, in the con-
currence, Justice Thomas agreed with the Court’s opinion in its en-
tirety, but expressed concerns about modern severability precedent
as contradicting the founding fathers’ traditional limits on judicial
authority.212  Justice Thomas reasoned that statutory interpretation
and severability required courts to make “nebulous [inquiries] into
hypothetical congressional intent” and moved courts “dangerously
close to issuing advisory opinions.”213  The dissent believed the un-
constitutional provision can and should have been severed from the
constitutional provision to save PASPA.214  As such, the dissenting
judges lamented the “wrecking ball” approach rather trying to “ac-
complish what Congress sought to achieve.”215
The founding fathers intended to keep the three branches of
government distinct from one another, but with each possessing in-
211. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484 (diverging on whether to save PASPA via
severability).
212. See id. at 1485 (citing Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 738, 769 (2010)) (concurring to warn of infringement on separation of
powers between judiciary and legislature with severability discussed in dissent that
empowers judicial branch to become lawmakers on national policy decisions) (dis-
cussing original and historical precedent on severability doctrine available to early
American courts was in stark contrast to development modern precedent on sever-
ability doctrine)); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating “it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is” through interpretation not severability because judicial review was merely a “by-
product” of judicial process).
213. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1486 (Thomas, J. concurring) (noting statuary in-
terpretation and severability require Court to guess what Congress “would have
intended had it known that part of its statute was unconstitutional” with or without
evidence) (citing U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005)); see also Robert L.
Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76,
77 (1937) (illustrating irrational credence to hypothetical intentions); see also
Brian Charles Lea, Situational Severability, 103 VA. L. REV. 735, 788–803 (2017)
(risking complete and endless reworking of law to make it operable for goals)).
214. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487–90 (dissenting Breyer, J., Ginsberg, J.,
Sotomayer, J.) (noting means as unconstitutional, not ends; posing idea that alter-
native constitutional theories could uphold “means to achieve its ends”).  The dis-
senting Justices argued neither provision “commands States to do anything other
than desist from conduct federal law proscribes,” essentially describing majority
opinion on commandeering and relied heavily on opinion of New York and Printz.
Id. at 1489 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 1489–90 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (dissenting that people would
blur lines of political accountability because law would “unmistakably” be charged
to congressional, not state, legislative action; dissenting from majority to severe
unconstitutional provision and keep constitutional provision because “[o]n no ra-
tional ground can it be concluded that Congress would have preferred no statute
at all if it could not prohibit states from authorizing or licensing such schemes”).
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herent power.216  It is unlikely the framers could have imagined the
severability precedent would evolve into judicial activism, as illus-
trated in the Third Circuit’s recommendations.217  The courts
should revert to simply declining to enforce an unconstitutional
statute in its entirety, and allow the legislature to remand the law,
rather than “sever and excise” the statute.218  The reversal of mod-
ern severability precedent to traditional notions of judicial review
will restore the separation of powers, similar to the restoration of
the balance of powers.219 Murphy has the potential to be a
landmark severability case, in addition to its anti-commandeering
milestones, with the possibility of strengthening fundamental con-
cepts like “dual sovereignty.”220
VI. PARLAYING THE WIN: THE IMPACT OF A HOMERUN RULING FOR
FUTURE WINNING STREAKS OF STATES’ RIGHTS CASES
The Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy will have historical,
rippling effects on federalism – increasing scrutiny of federal regu-
lations that affirmatively or prohibitively command states to refrain
from a specific course of action.221  The Court’s ruling will impact a
variety of areas of law and has already been cited several times to
bolster arguments for states’ rights against federal regulation.222
216. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison) (describing our
founding fathers’ intent for creating separation of power between branches and
balance of powers between governments).
217. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485 (applying intent to Third Circuit decisions’
determining court should not have given suggestion that had to be retracted as
unnecessary dicta especially since suggestion is not even sound advice when
applied).
218. See id. at 1487 (citing Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ.,
550 U.S. 81, 119 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and stating America should have a
“government of laws, not men” and courts would do harm by creating hypothetical
legislative intentions) (rebutting dissents’ overextended modern precedent
approach).
219. For a further discussion of the balance of powers, see supra note 216 and R
accompanying text.
220. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471 (explaining victory helps uphold state sov-
ereignty from infringement of its rights and rights of its people under constitu-
tional federalism principles and protections embodied in U.S. Constitution by our
Founding Fathers).
221. See Illya Somin, Federalism Comes Out as the Winner in Murphy v. NCAA, THE
REGULATORY REVIEW (July 10, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/07/10/
somin-federalism-comes-out-winner-murphy-v-ncaa/ [https://perma.cc/Z7E8-
5QD9] (applying Murphy ruling to more than sports law).
222. See Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 430 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Con-
gress’s legislative powers are limited to those enumerated under the Constitu-
tion.”) (citing Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476); see also U.S. v. California, 921 F.3d 865,
888 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The Constitution . . . ‘confers upon Congress the power to
regulate individuals, not States.’”) (quoting Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476); Extenet
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The ramifications of ending PASPA’s prohibition on sports gam-
bling is far from over, and laws on the state and federal level will
need to be reconciled.223  The Supreme Court recognizing the reg-
ulation of sports gambling is an important policy choice.224
The Court discussed potential ramifications of its decision to
strike down PASPA and hinted at a potential need for new regula-
tions to replace the void.225  Sports gambling will inevitably prolifer-
ate, but will not be allowed to grow unchecked, perpetuating
thriving illegal activity.226  To provide uniformity, legislatures will
be compelled to pass new constitutional regulations by additional
regulations in order to create a regulatory framework to protect
consumers and the integrity of sports.227
A. Implications on Federal Regulations in Favor of State
Regulations
The Supreme Court decision upends the traditional notion of
“dual sovereignty” and creates a balance of power tension.228  The
Sys. v. Pelham, 377 F. Supp. 3d 217, 224–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“This ‘anticom-
mandeering doctrine . . . withhold[s] from Congress the power to issue orders
directly to the States.’” (quoting Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475)).
223. See Ryan Rodenberg, Sports Betting Myth Busters: PASPA is Part of a Federal
Framework of Gambling Laws, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Jan. 8, 2018), https://
www.legalsportsreport.com/17391/sports-betting-myth-busters-paspa-framework/
[https://perma.cc/HPF5-PN67] (describing how PASPA simply banned sports bet-
ting and different states had their own sports betting laws prior to enactment of
PASPA).
224. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484 (recognizing potential ramifications for
ruling law unconstitutional; emphasizing “the choice is not ours to make,” and
main responsibility of courts is to interpret laws and determine consistency with
U.S. Constitution not create regulations).
225. See id. (discussing need for Congressional or state action).
226. See Brendan F. Conley, Home the Rise of the Daily Fantasy Sports Industry Can
Catalyze the Liberalization of Sports Betting Policies in the United States, 66 BUFF. L. REV.
715, 722 (2018) (criticizing growth of illegal gambling under PASPA and need to
prohibit illegal market for “a number of [consumer] regulations and safeguards”
with oversight protection); see also Brnovich, supra note 54, at 259 (stating effective R
regulations need “to ensure the integrity of the game, protect the player, and keep
criminal elements from infiltrating the industry”).
227. See generally Brnovich, supra note 54, (discussing alternative frameworks R
on state and federal level that will have tax and uniformity implications to be ad-
dressed).  New federal regulations would have to be constitutionally sound regula-
tion though Congressional mechanisms, directly imposed on private actors and
not states, and allow states to work out regulations which could lead to conflict, or
the federal government could provide a federal framework for nationwide uni-
formity. See id. (reviewing framework suggestions).
228. See generally Brnovich, supra note 54, (discussing how federalism protects R
individuals from government); see also Richard Frank, What Does Sports Gambling
Have to Do with Environmental Law? A Lot, Potentially, Following the Supreme Court’s
Murphy v. NCAA Decision, LEGAL PLANET (June 19, 2018), https://legal-planet.org/
2018/06/06/what-does-sports-gambling-have-to-do-with-environmental-law/
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six-to-three decision in Murphy, written by Justice Alito, will spur a
host of litigation rebutting the federal government’s attempt to in-
tervene in the state’s legislative process.229  The potential for litiga-
tion will attempt to shift power from the federal government back
to the states.230  Further, states will likely challenge areas of law cur-
rently regulated by the federal government under the guise of
other constitutional mechanisms, arguing a violation of the Tenth
Amendment and the anti-commandeering principle.231  Therefore,
the Supreme Court’s ruling will have unintended consequences
that extend beyond sports gambling, specifically to immigration,
drug enforcement, environmental, and taxing authority law.232
First, the anti-commandeering principles reaffirmed in the
PASPA holding will have implications on immigration law and
states’ rights to maintain sanctuary cities.233  By definition, sanctu-
ary cities “limit how much local law enforcement officials can com-
ply with federal immigration authorities.”234  Under the current
administration, President Trump and now former Attorney General
Jeff Sessions “waged an ongoing series of legal battles” over sanctu-
ary cities violating federal immigration law.235  In January 2017,
[https://perma.cc/8YX6-79JL] (reviewing commandeering principle as “apho-
rism” and historical context of Virginia versus New Jersey Plan); see generally Greg-
ory R. Bordelon, The De-Federalization Gamble: A Workable Anti-Commandeering
Framework for States Seeking to Legalize Certain Vice Areas, 20 ATL. L.J. 103 (2018) (dis-
cussing potential for uncertainty given rulings implications are broad in scope and
will lead to push back from states to stop federal government from exercising influ-
ence and control within states).
229. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1489 (demonstrating number of Justices favor-
ing majority opinion, none of them outright rejecting core holding regarding con-
stitutionality of PASPA and even attempt to save remainder of law).
230. See Ilya Somin, What Supreme Court Victory For Sports Gambling Means For
Marijuana, Sanctuary Cities, USA TODAY (May 15, 2018), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/opinion/2018/05/15/sports-gambling-supreme-court-federalism-mari-
juana-sanctuary-cities-column/610876002/ [https://perma.cc/KK6F-P2S2] (illus-
trating shifting power from federal to state level of government with wide
influences).
231. See generally Bordelon, supra note 228 (noting importance to empower R
states and curtail federal regulations that are incoherent or incompatible with U.S.
Constitution).
232. For a further discussion of the law affected, see infra notes 233–271and
accompanying text.
233. For a further discussion on immigration law, see infra notes 233–244 and
accompanying text.
234. See Kaitlyn Schallhorn, Sanctuary Cities: What are They?, FOX NEWS (Mar.
22, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/sanctuary-cities-what-are-they
[https://perma.cc/V4YH-7TZH] (defining and describing sanctuary cities from
San Francisco, California in 1989 to entire states like California today that are ig-
noring federal immigration law).
235. See Illya Somin, Fight Over Sanctuary Cities is Also a Fight Over Federalism,
THE HILL (April 7, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/381998-
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President Trump issued an Executive Order pulling virtually all fed-
eral grants from cities and states that violate 8 U.S.C. Section 1373
and then-Attorney General Sessions imposed conditions on Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) Grants as well.236  The Executive Order is
unconstitutional for two reasons: first, “[o]nly Congress has the
power to spend money or impose conditions on federal grants,”
and second, following the decision in Murphy the federal govern-
ment cannot commandeer the states with prohibitive commands.237
Both President Trump’s and then-Attorney General Sessions’
actions have been challenged in federal court, resulting in a win for
state rights in accordance with the principles of federalism upheld
in Murphy.238  Specifically, in City and Cty. of S.F. v. Sessions,239 the
district court ruled that Trump’s Executive Order is unconstitu-
tional  because it violated the Spending Clause; additionally, Cali-
fornia argued that even if passed by Congress, the conditions at
issue would be unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering
doctrine.240  Likewise, in City of Phila. v. Att’y Gen.,241 the Third Cir-
cuit ruled that Sessions’ grant conditions were ruled unconstitu-
tional because they violated the Separation of Powers; Philadelphia
also argued that even if passed by Congress the condition at issue
would be unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doc-
trine.242  Supposedly, it is possible that 8 U.S.C. Section 1373 may
also be similarly overturned, but the federal government will likely
fight-over-sanctuary-cities-is-also-a-fight-over-federalism [https://perma.cc/7GM4-
5EQB] (discussing current litigation).
236. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2019) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Fed-
eral, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may
not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending
to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information re-
garding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
individual.”).
237. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475
(2018) (noting Congress cannot commandeer states); see also Somin, supra note
238 (noting Executive cannot impede on Legislative branch’s powers). R
238. See Illya Somin, Trump Administration Loses Yet Another Sanctuary City Case
– this Time in the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, REASON  (Feb. 20, 2019,
3:13 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2019/02/20/trump-administration-loses-
yet-another-s [https://perma.cc/DKR6-4JME] (explaining three conditions AG
placed on DOJ grants).
239. 372 F. Supp. 3d 928 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
240. See id. at 947 (supporting ruling with high odds Ninth Circuit will likely
affirm).
241. 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019).
242. See id. at 284 (supporting ruling with high odds that Supreme Court will
likely not grant certiorari); see also Somin, supra note 235 (explaining if authority R
not granted to it in Constitution, it “literally has no power to act . . .  unless and
until Congress confers power upon it.” (citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355, 374 (1986))).
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argue that immigration is an enumerated power, which preempts
the states’ authority on such matters.243  Therefore, Murphy creates
a strong defense for states against federal infringement on dual sov-
ereignty and bolsters the argument in favor of sanctuary cities.244
Second, the anti-commandeering principles reaffirmed in the
PASPA holding will have implications on drug enforcement and
states’ right to legalize medical and recreational marijuana.245  In
1937, the Marijuana Tax Act “essentially made the plant illegal in
the United States,” and in 1971, the Controlled Substances Act pro-
hibited recreational and medical marijuana as a “Schedule I”
drug.246  As of 2018, after years of costly prohibition, ten states le-
galized recreational marijuana and thirty-four states legalized medi-
cal marijuana.247  The prohibition of sports gambling is analogous
to the prohibition of marijuana because the legislative intent to reg-
ulate the morality and the states’ desire to cash in on tax revenue is
uncanny, so much so that marijuana advocates even wrote an ami-
cus brief for the State of New Jersey.248
Despite a recent reversal of the Cole memo, which halted fed-
eral enforcement of marijuana prohibitions due to limited re-
sources, it is evident that the federal government has not done
enough to stem the tide of marijuana as a priority.249  Robert
243. For a further discussion on § 1373, see supra note 231 (elaborating on R
§ 1373); see generally Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461
(2018) (reiterating potential implications on more than just sports gambling).
244. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475
(2018) (reiterating potential implications on more than just sports gambling).
245. For a further discussion on drug enforcement, see infra notes 235–242 R
and accompanying text.
246. See Allison McNearney, The Complicated History of Cannabis in the US, HIS-
TORY (April 20, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/marijuana-criminalization-
reefer-madness-history-flashback [https://perma.cc/GYF9-UMU7] (describing
first law prohibiting marijuana nationwide); see also 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2019) (listing
marijuana as Schedule I drug along with heroin).
247. See Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS. (Dec. 14,
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-over
view.aspx [https://perma.cc/8WN8-GBRQ] (numbering states with recreational
marijuana); see also State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGIS., (Mar. 5, 2019) http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-mari-
juana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/HYK3-AHHK] (numbering states with medical
marijuana).
248. See Vince Silwoski, U.S. Supreme Court Sets a Great Precedent for Cannibis,
CANNALAWBLOG (May 16, 2018), https://www.cannalawblog.com/u-s-supreme-
court-sets-a-great-precedent-for-cannabis/ [https://perma.cc/NP4G-7V7S] (distin-
guishing current marijuana law from issue in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005),
and concluding it would be “hard to imagine any other outcome” if federal gov-
ernment tried to shutter states’ rights).
249. See Scott Bomboy, Federal Marijuana Policy Change Raises Significant Ques-
tions, CONSTITUTION DAILY (Jan. 4, 2018) https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/fed-
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Mikos, a law professor at Vanderbilt University, recently stated that
“[t]he agency simply doesn’t have the spare resources that would
be needed to mount an effective campaign against today’s mari-
juana industry,” let alone the will of the people.250  Eventually, it is
possible that marijuana prohibitions may be overturned, but the
federal government will rely on the traditional notion of the
Supremacy Clause regarding such matters.251  Therefore, Murphy
creates a strong defense for states against federal infringement on
dual sovereignty and bolsters the argument in favor of marijuana
use.252
Third, the anti-commandeering principles reaffirmed in the
PASPA holding will have implications on environmental law and
states’ rights to refuse to implement mandates.253  The majority of
federal environmental regulations are enforced by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and adopted by the states via
“cooperative federalism.”254  Cooperative federalism involves the
federal government and the states cooperating “to develop and im-
plement a federal policy.”255
Within environmental law, these arrangements tend to border
on unconstitutional coerciveness and can leave a state that “volunta-
rily agreed to cooperate at one time [finding] itself coerced into
enforcing a costly, ineffective, or unpopular policy forever, if Con-
eral-marijuana-policy-change-raises-significant-questions [https://perma.cc/SQ6U-
WWTL] (reversing President Obama’s DOJ Attorney memo to limit enforcement
of marijuana was policy decision, likewise President Trump’s DOJ Attorney memo
to make enforcement of marijuana a priority is policy decision too but states are
pushing back following Murphy, stating it is “undue federal infringement”).
250. Mike Maharrey, Law Professor Tells State Legislators Feds Can’t Enforce Their
Marijuana Laws, TENTH AMEND. CENTER (Sept. 7, 2018), https://blog.tenthamend-
mentcenter.com/2018/09/law-professor-tells-state-legislators-feds-cant-enforce-
their-marijuana-laws/ [https://perma.cc/939B-MP7T] (elaborating on statement
that “[t]he anti-commandeering rule empowers the states to legalize an activity, for
purposes of state law, even when Congress forbids the same activity” and why gov-
ernment cannot and will not crack down on marijuana at National Conference of
State Legislatures 2018 Legislative Summit in Los Angeles, California).
251. See generally Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461
(2018) (reiterating potential implications on more than just sports gambling).
252. See id. at 1475 (reiterating potential implications on more than just
sports gambling).
253. For a further discussion on environmental law, see infra notes 243–249 R
and accompanying text.
254. See Jonathan Wood & Illya Shapiro, Christie v. NCAA: Anti-Commandeering
or Bust, 18 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 56, 59 (2017) available at https://object.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/articles/christie_v_ncaa_for_fedsoc_rev.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YBN3-TWKQ] (describing EPA and cooperative federalism among feds
and states).
255. See id. (illustrating how issues can arise when dealing with mandates).
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gress forbade subsequent state reform.”256  Thus, the anti-comman-
deering principle in Murphy may be used to promote participation
in such programs with the assumption that states may withdraw at a
later date.257  It is possible that some regulations involving the Cali-
fornia water crisis, the construction of more nuclear power plants,
and the protection of coal mines may also be overturned, given few
arguments from the federal government supporting environmental
mandates.258  Therefore, Murphy has created a strong defense for
states against federal infringement on dual sovereignty and bolsters
the argument for less environmental mandates.259
Fourth, the anti-commandeering principles reaffirmed in the
PASPA holding will have implications on tax law and states’ rights
with regards to congressional limitations on tax authority.260  It is
not possible to argue that “a whole host of federal statutes limit the
tax authority of states and their subdivisions,” which accordingly to
Murphy is unconstitutional for two reasons.261  The Supreme Court
ruled that “Congress cannot issue [a] direct order to state legisla-
tures” because it would be contrary to the anti-commandeering
principle.262  Further, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress can-
not use the Supremacy Clause as a defense because preemption
theory only applies to private actors not states.263  Since any affirma-
tive and prohibitive command can now theoretically implicate the
anti-commandeering principle, federal laws will now be more
harshly scrutinized.264
Some potential areas of contention for future tax law litigation
include laws beginning with the words “No State . . . .”265  For in-
stance, the federal government currently prohibits states from im-
256. Id. (providing context to potential environmental litigation cases).
257. See id. (discouraging state participation would harm environment).
258. See Frank, supra note 228 (emphasizing importance of ruling as “bul- R
wark” for states).
259. See generally Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461,
1461 (2018) (reiterating potential implications on more than just sports
gambling).
260. For a further discussion on taxing authority, see infra notes 250–258 and R
accompanying text.
261. Daniel Hemel, Justice Alito, State Tax Hero?, MEDIUM (May 15, 2018),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/justice-alito-state-tax-hero-333830
d097ab [https://perma.cc/4X2H-A5BM] (arguing there are implications on state
taxing authority as well).
262. See id. (referencing Murphy and its anti-commandeering holding).
263. See id. (referring to Murphy and its preemption holding).
264. See id. (criticizing potentially every federal law, stating any federal law
that say “state cannot regulate X” should be scrutinized as commandeering).
265. See id. (interpreting anti-commandeering holding to apply broadly to any
prohibitive command, or at least allow states to make argument against them).
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posing any taxes on internet access under the Internet Tax
Freedom Act, limits states from imposing high taxes on electricity
generated from intrastate commerce, and protects members of
Congress and out-of-state businesses from property taxes.266  Look-
ing forward, it is possible that these tax prohibitions may be over-
turned without compensation, withholding any valid arguments
from the federal government supporting its taxing powers on such
matter.267  Therefore, it will likely be a matter of time before litiga-
tion arises, Murphy creates a strong defense for states against federal
infringement on dual sovereignty and bolsters the argument in
favor of taxing authority.268
Thus, despite the implications of Murphy on immigration, drug
enforcement, environmental, and taxing authority law, the Su-
preme Court’s decision will likely not open the floodgates to litiga-
tion.269  Rather, the reaffirmation and expansion of anti-
commandeering principles will provide leverage for states’ rights
and bolster defenses against federal regulations.270  Going forward,
Murphy will be referenced frequently as a win for states, regardless
of the regulatory framework adopted to replace PASPA and legal
sports gambling.271
B. The Reconciliation of Conflicting Federal Laws
For roughly twenty years, PASPA has not conflicted with any
federal laws.272  However, now the uncertainty of what the federal
266. See id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2019) (“No State . . . may impose any . . .
[t]axes on Internet access . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 391 (“No State . . .  may
impose or assess a tax on or with respect to the generation or transmission of
electricity which . . . results, either directly or indirectly, in a greater tax burden on
electricity which is generated and transmitted in interstate commerce than on elec-
tricity which is generated and transmitted in intrastate commerce.”); see also 4
U.S.C. § 113 (2019) (“No State . . . in which a Member of Congress maintains a
place of abode for purposes of attending sessions of Congress may, for purposes of
any income tax . . . treat such Member as a resident or domiciliary . . . .”).
267. See generally Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461
(2018) (reiterating potential implications on more than just sports gambling).
268. See id. at 1475 (reiterating potential implications on more than just
sports gambling).
269. See Frank, supra note 228 (illustrating a “wide swath” of other issues R
where state and federal interests often “diverge,” potentially leading to litigation
conflicts).
270. See id. (mentioning Murphy as potential litigation strategy for state
rights).
271. For a further discussion on potential regulation resolutions, see infra
notes 273–287 and accompanying text. R
272. See Chuck Humphrey, US Federal Gambling Laws, GAMBLING-LAW-US,
http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Federal-Laws/ [https://perma.cc/8DJ5-EPS5]
(last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (listing federal gambling laws).
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government may do could lead to sports gambling restrictions
through three major federal laws, each originally intended to
weaken illegal interstate activities supporting organized crime.273
These federal regulations — the “Federal Wire Act”,274 “Illegal
Gambling Business Act”,275 and “Unlawful Internet Gambling En-
forcement Act”276 — will need to be reconciled to prevent conflict-
ing federal laws and varying state laws that may adversely affect
consumers, leagues, and regulators creating a compelling need for
a uniform federal regulatory framework.277
Currently, the federal government is actively attempting to fill
and expand the void of PASPA using the Wire Act.278  On January
15, 2019, the DOJ released a legal memo discussing the applicabil-
ity of the Wire Act to non-sports gambling.279  The DOJ’s decision
to apply “all but one of the prohibitions of the Wire Act” to the
gaming industry is not only a major setback to the development of
legal sports gambling but also to the gaming industry as a whole.280
Following the interpretation, New Jersey and a few other states chal-
273. See generally Jennifer Gaynor et al., Will You Soon Be Able to Legally Bet on
Sports Outside of Nevada?, 26 NEV. LAW. 8 (2018) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1804 as
“The Federal Wire Act”, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 as “The Illegal Gambling Business Act”,
and 31 U.S.C. § 5361 as “The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act”).
274. See 18 U.S.C. § 1804 (2019) (“Whoever being engaged in the business of
betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmis-
sion in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in
the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmis-
sion of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or
credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of
bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .”).
275. See §1955 (paraphrasing elements as: conduct that finances, managers,
supervises, directs, or owns, all or in part of illegal gambling business that is viola-
tion of law).
276. See §5361 (prohibiting “anyone in the business of betting or wagering
from accepting anything of value in the furtherance of illegal online wagering”
and requiring financial institutions to block transfer for online gambling).
277. See Gaynor et al., supra note 273, at 9 (posing questions about state law,
such as: “who will regulate sports wagering within their state; the taxes and licens-
ing fees to impose; the licensing process and who will be subject to licensing; who
can take sports wagers; what events may be wagered upon; and whether licenses
may accept wagers that are placed over the telephone or via the internet”).
278. See The Legal Blitz, Trump Administration Takes Aims at Online Gambling in
Sudden Wire Act Reversal, ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 16, 2019), https://abovethelaw.
com/2019/01/trump-administration-takes-aim-at-online-gambling-in-sudden-wire-
act-reversal/ [https://perma.cc/5PDQ-WX9Q] (noting shock to memo
announcement).
279. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, AP-
PLICABILITY OF THE WIRE ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, TO NON-SPORTS GAMBLING, (Jan. 15,
2019) available at https://www.justice.gov/file/1124286/download [https://
perma.cc/YV6C-TVZQ] (including all gambling in law).
280. See id. at n.1 (noting its application in almost every situation regarding
gambling).
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lenged the DOJ in federal court stating that the “DOJ [was] break-
ing both the legislative intent of the Wire Act and findings in at
least two federal circuit courts, all of which point to the idea the
Wire Act only deals with sports wagering.”281  States are seeking a
repeal of the DOJ’s interpretation that contradicts precedent and
the inherent interstate nature of the gaming industry.282
Given these developments, it seems the federal government
does not intend to pullback its federal regulations on sports gam-
bling following the defeat of PASPA.283  Thus, despite the dysfunc-
tional partisanship in Washington D.C. today, it is likely a new
federal regulatory framework will be introduced.284  If regulations
are enacted, they will need to protect states’ rights and reconcile
current laws with a common set of standards to foster the develop-
ment of sports wagering and gambling in accord with the Com-
merce Clause.285
C. Recommendations for a Federal Regulatory Framework
On August 29, 2018, Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) recog-
nized the ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision and put
forth a potential comprehensive federal framework.286  The frame-
work outlined three pillars: “[1] protecting young people and those
suffering from gambling addiction, [2] protecting the integrity of
the game, and [3] protecting consumers and individuals placing
bets.”287  Specifically, the framework posited imposing age restric-
tions on betting and discouraging advertisements targeting young
people, therefore allowing the leagues to determine acceptable bets
281. See Dustin Gouker, All Aboard The Wire Act Case: NJ, PA, Michigan Leaf
Challenge to DOJ in Federal Court, ONLINE POKER REPORT (Mar. 9, 2019), https://
www.onlinepokerreport.com/35844/pa-and-michigan-want-to-join-wire-act-case/
[https://perma.cc/M3J8-H6GY] (providing context to ongoing litigation over
DOJ memo).
282. See id. (explaining complete contradiction in jurisprudence).
283. See id. (reiterating federal law still prohibits certain gambling
transactions).
284. For further discussion on political partisanship on Capitol Hill today, see
infra notes 287–297 and accompanying text.
285. See Dustin Gouker, National Council On Problem Gambling: States Have Done
‘Poorly’ On Building Sports Betting Laws, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/29897/ncpg-on-sports-betting-2019/ [https://
perma.cc/T7SX-DDKF] (demonstrating need for reconciliation of conflicting laws
and issues with internet via state commission regulation).
286. See Tal Axelrod, Schumer Outlines Federal Sports Betting Framework, THE
HILL (Aug. 29, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/404212-schumer-
outlines-federal-sports-betting-framework-report [https://perma.cc/AT4B-H3FY]
(discussing potential federal regulations).
287. Id. (describing three pillars of law).
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made from official data.288  The use of an integrity fee may also be
utilized to increase monitoring.289  From a regulatory perspective,
the framework would help minimize conflicts of law “to prevent un-
certainty and confusion for the league, state governments, consum-
ers, and fans alike.”290  If new federal regulations are proposed for a
national uniform approach to sports gambling, it will be through
constitutional means and may be met with reluctant acceptance or
more likely stern pushback.291
The casino industry is already working with leagues “to ensure
proper protections and integrity” of sports wagering with the help
of state policy by legislatures, regulators, and operators.292  Like-
wise, states are working quickly to legalize sports gambling, with
twelve to twenty states currently attempting to pass legislation.293
Self-evident regulation and consistency would be preferred, but reg-
ulators must act quickly, with or without the guidance of the federal
government on a uniform framework.294  For instance, in 2017, cus-
tomers bet nearly five billion dollars in Nevada — a small fraction
of the potential tax revenue for other states attempting to legalize
sports gambling.295  Thus, sports gambling will not only benefit
gamblers, but will also allow the states and leagues to profit from
the mutual benefit of legalizing sports gambling.296  Until otherwise
288. See id. (specifying caveat to potential regulations).
289. See Conley, supra note 226, at 774 (stating integrity fees or 1% tax on bets R
“would help [leagues] to regulate and enforce transparent, legal gambling opera-
tions, [to] offset any threats to . . . image and public perception”).
290. Axelrod, supra note 286 (discussing benefits of federal regulation). R
291. See Patrick Moran, Anyone’s Game: Sports-Betting Regulations after Murphy v.
NCAA, CATO INST., (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/legal-pol-
icy-bulletin/anyones-game-sports-betting-regulations-after-murphy-v-ncaa [https://
perma.cc/4ZWX-YUVR] (speculating alternative approaches to federal regulations
and possible criticism from states).
292. See id. (facilitating government regulation rather than industry self-
regulation).
293. See Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of
Where Every State Stands, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/
19740480/gambling-sports-betting-bill-tracker-all-50-states [https://perma.cc/
W5JF-9Y94] (last updated Dec. 30, 2019) (following development of state level le-
galization); supra note 273, at 9 (describing Nevada as possible model for state R
regulation).
294. See Axelrod, supra note 290 (describing federal regulations as “abject fail- R
ure” and giving rise to activity on black market and if regulations are not created
properly will spur illegal activity to corrupt “wholesome entertainment”).
295. See Brnovich, supra note 54, at 259 (emphasizing states will legalize sports R
gambling for money but it will be interesting to see what happens to Nevada now
that its’ monopoly is coming to end starting this year Delaware, not New Jersey, will
be the first state to permit legal sports wagering bets).
296. See Conley, supra note 226, at 772 (illustrating “industry can endure, if R
not thrive, while the consumer gets much-needed regulatory protections, competi-
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noted, states should regulate sports gambling similar to that of Ne-
vada and wait to see if the federal government intervenes to create
uniformity.297
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, congressional policy was poorly executed when
PASPA was passed, which led to an unnecessary and unconstitu-
tional ban on sports gambling for more than twenty years.298  New
Jersey persistently argued PASPA was unconstitutional, despite mul-
tiple judicial losses at the district and appellate level, culminating
with the Supreme Court eventually validating their argument.299
The Supreme Court found PASPA unconstitutional in Murphy be-
cause it violated state sovereignty protected under the Tenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.300
The Murphy ruling is now the third case involving federal laws
that were struck down under the anti-commandeering principle
and will be more influential on federal-state regulations than gam-
bling long-term.301  The ramifications of the ruling are yet to be
fully seen, but the burgeoning field of legal sports gambling will be
widespread and the development of sports gambling regulations
will need to be assessed for the best interest of all parties.302  As for
Murphy’s impact on state autonomy, the odds are in the states’
tive safeguards, and transparency, and the states reap the benefits of increased
revenue”).
297. See Wayne Perry, States Eye Sports Betting, Wrestle with Regulatory Details, AP
(Nov. 27, 2018) https://www.apnews.com/922420cc9c6b44cbb0dee83b7df31ab1
[https://perma.cc/N2Z2-MTPY] (describing regulatory uncertainty among states
legalizing sports gambling).
298. For further discussion of longtime gambling prohibitions in America
and its first challenge from New Jersey, see supra notes 49–55 and accompanying
text.
299. For further discussion of litigation challenges in order for New Jersey to
legalize sports gambling, see supra notes 76–131 and accompanying text; see also
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (vindicating
challenges).
300. For further discussion of Supreme Court’s decision in favor of legalizing
sports gambling via Tenth Amendment, see supra notes 132–136 and accompany-
ing text.
301. For further discussion of New York and Printz as only two other cases de-
cided under anti-commandeering doctrine, see supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
302. For further discussion of regulations to support the growth of sports
gambling and add consumer protections, see supra notes 286–297 and accompany-
ing text.
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favor, and it’s time for sports gambling institutions to place their
bets.303
Christopher Bret Alexander*
303. For further discussion of future state challenges to drug, immigration,
environment, and tax law, see supra notes 271–297 and accompanying text.
* M.B.A., J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Villanova Charles Widger School of Law.
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